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Abstract 
The present thesis is an attempt to bring into dialogue what appear to be two radically different 
approaches of negotiating subjectivity in late Western Modernity. Here the thought of Julia Kristeva as 
well as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are fully engaged. These thinkers, the latter two being 
considered as one, have until now remained strangers to one another. Consequently much confusion has 
amassed concerning their respective philosophical, as well as social/political projects. I take up the 
position that Deleuze and Guattari's account of subjectivity is a commendable attempt to understand a 
particular type of historical subject: late modern Western man. However I claim that their account comes 
up short insofar as I argue that they lack the theoretical language in order to fully, and successfully, make 
their point. Thus I argue that their system does not stand up to its own claims. On the contrary, by 
embracing the psychoanalytic tradition - staying rather close to the Freudian and Kleinian schools of 
thought - I argue that it is in fact Kristeva that is better equipped to provide an account of this particular 
subject. Considerable time is invested in fleshing out the notion of the Other insofar as this Other is 
central to the constitution of subjectivity. This Other - insofar as this Other is to be found in Kristeva's 
notion of the chora -- is something I claim that Deleuze and Guattari simply undervalued. 
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Anti-Oedipus en-proces: 
A comparative analysis of Kristeva and Deleuze & Guattari 
Introduction -
Ellis 1 
Kristeva was once asked in an interview why she chose not to follow Deleuze 
when Anti-Oedipus was published in 1972, opting instead to pursue psychoanalytic 
training by undergoing therapy in 1973? Aside from replying that she was in fact 
receptive to Deleuze's anarchism as well as the fact that she considered him to be perhaps 
the most original and radical of contemporary philosophers, she nonetheless defended the 
indispensible nature of the "father" as a psychoanalytic concept (both as a source and 
inhibitor of desire) that Deleuze rejected. l 
In an elegy to Sartre that Deleuze wrote and which serves as part of an essay on 
Sartre that Kristeva included as part of her Sense and Nonsense of Revolt Deleuze says of 
Sartre: "He was my master." Aside from Deleuze lamenting "the sadness of generations 
without masters" he talks about the fact that Sartre provided a new language to a culture 
in need of new expression.2 Kristeva remarks that this is not what one would expect from 
the author of Anti-Oedipus. Could this elegy represent an unconscious confession of a 
possible limit to his and Guattari's notion of subjectivity? Has the psychoanalytic notion 
of the father been undervalued in their philosophy? Is Sartre Deleuze and Guattari' s 
father as Freud spoke of the father in Totem and Taboo? If so, are there other concepts 
within Deleuze and Guattari's corpus that require a revaluation? I answer yes to all ofthe 
above.3 
The above example is intended to set the tone for that which is to follow 
throughout the remainder of the present thesis. It is my explicit intention to highlight the 
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advantages one accrues by means of endorsing Kristeva's interpretation of the 
constitution of subjectivity, predicated as it is on the adoption of specifically reworked 
versions of Freudian psychoanalysis and Hegelian negativity. One will find that these 
advantages are associated with the acceptance of the notion of the semiotic chora, a 
notion that Deleuze and Guattari fully reject. 
The present thesis is divided into 7 parts. Part 1 is intended to continue where this 
introduction leaves off through illustrating the centrality of what is known as the 
"signifying process" especially how it is developed in Kristeva's early work Revolution 
in Poetic Language. and how it relates to the constitution of subjectivity. The signifying 
process is a phenomenon that will allow for the present author to negotiate the asserted 
advantage Kristeva promises over that of Deleuze and Guattari without assuming outright 
Kristeva's position qua psychoanalyst. I want to stress here that I will not hold Deleuze 
and Guattari up to purely psychoanalytic premises. Such a method would be preemptive 
and logically fallacious. By focusing on the "signifying process" I shall avoid this trap. 
Part 2 situates the present study within the psychoanalytic tradition which is of 
considerable influence upon Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari. In this section I 
will carefully consider the main contributions of Freud, Lacan, and Klein. Part 3 
examines closer the theoretical differences (and similarities) between Lacan and Kristeva. 
Specifically the notions of lack and loss will be negotiated to determine to what extent 
Kristeva's notion ofloss is special with respect to Lacan's lack. Part 4 provides an 
exegesis of the tradition to which Deleuze and Guattari are closely affiliated: affirmation. 
Part 5 examines the thought of the later Kristeva focusing on her "Trilogy of the 80's." 
Part 6 examines the "signifying process" as it is developed in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. Finally Part 7 engages with all the foregoing in what I offer as a personal 
criticism of the notion of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari advance in their 
philosophy. 
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In short, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of the notion of the semiotic 
chora and their questionable account of the notion of the Other is detrimental to their 
overall philosophical project as one that purports affirmation and ecstaticjouissance. This 
thesis holds steadfast to the idea that only a philosophy grounded in a notion of negativity 
and the Other, such as Kristeva's, can truly meet these goals. 
Part 1: The signifying process and the advantage of the drive 
Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari were part of a generation that was 
attracted to psychoanalysis because of Lacan's teachings. Lacan remodeled Freudian 
psychoanalysis by means of integrating linguistic theory developed by Ferdinand de 
Saussure as well as Claude Levi-Strauss among other structuralists. However, Kristeva, 
asked in an interview as to whether she thought her emphasis on Freud (and a return to 
the notion of the drives) was a critique of Lacan, replied in the affirmative and that she 
believed, "Lacanians have neglected the role of the drive. The drive is clearly an 
imaginary construction (we can neither see it nor locate it), but it is an essential one that 
enables the analyst to remain at the crossroads between the symbolic and the somatic.,,4 
Kristeva's return to the Freudian notion of the drives is an important move to consider 
especially when negotiating the status of the late modern Western subject, a subject that 
has otherwise been negotiated as a mere logical or social construction - an assemblage of 
shifting signifiers -- and so on. 
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Kristeva's fascination with the drives is associated with a particular set of 
concepts that one finds within her general semiology (which she calls "semanalysis"); 
that is: "phenotext" and "genotext." These two concepts represent a certain way of 
approaching a text. For Kristeva the phenotext is literally that which follows the rules or 
laws of grammar and syntax (punctuation, spelling, etc) or, in short, the "symbolic." She 
writes: "We shall use the term phenotext to denote language that serves to communicate, 
which linguistics describes in terms of 'competence' and 'performance,.,,5 The genotext, 
on the other hand, denotes the non-symbolic, signifying patterns, or flows,·rhythms, and 
intonations inherent to a text. The genotext "includes drives, their disposition, and their 
division of the body, plus the ecological and social system surrounding the body, such as 
objects and pre-Oedipal relations with parents.,,6 In short, the genotext embodies the 
"musicality" of the phenotext. 
The above mentioned musicality of the phenotext holds important relevance for 
Kristeva and her understanding of the subject insofar as this inherent musicality renders 
the symbolic (a major aspect of what constitutes the subject) very unstable. This is a 
crucial element to Kristeva's thought and therefore one must be careful when unfurling it. 
Kristeva suggests there are similarities that the musicality of a text shares with the 
echolalias and glossolalias (nonsense "baby talk") of an infant, or pre-Mirror stage 
phenomena (more on the 'Mirror stage' later). Thus if we are to appropriate this 
framework we must flesh out an understanding of the pre-Mirror stage or pre-Oedipal 
phenomena that are relevant to the current discussion. 
Kristeva notes that "the oral cavity is the first organ of perception to develop and 
maintain the nursing infant's first contact with the outside but also with the other.,,7 Here 
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Kristeva acknowledges her indebtedness to Freud for his observation that during the pre-
Oedipal phase of development, the infant (or infans: pre-subjective infant) does not 
recognize any distinction between itself (e.g. its body) and the outside world (i.e. literally 
the milieu as well as 'other' individuals: the mother). I will expatiate to greater lengths 
upon Freud's interpretation of the structures of "primary narcissism" in a later section. 
The oral phase, or the "oral-ego" is intimately tethered to a correlate experience of 
pleasure, or what is known as the "pleasure-ego". This, Kristeva posits, is because of the 
function the oral cavity serves: one of "incorporation and unification.,,8 In wake of this 
the outside world is not recognized qua external reality. 
However, later in development the forces of pleasure become displaced onto the 
anus in what is referred to as the "anal-phase." Kristeva highlights the fact that Freud was 
rather silent on the subject of anality, insofar as he never says anything concerning the 
"drive bases" and/or pleasure associated with the act of rejection. As Kristeva points out, 
the anus, which is the last of the sphincters to be repressed, is in fact the most important 
when discussing the phenomenon of "rejection." Rejection for Freud signifies the 
primordial basis for the inauguration of the symbolic. For example, before the linguistic 
representation of negation can be established, (e.g. the verbal "No!"), a "symbolic 
rejection" must manifest itself (e.g. the infants feces). That is all. Kristeva takes issue 
with Freud's interpretation by saying that Freud has ignored the fact that "drives move 
through the sphincters and arouse pleasure at the very moment substances belonging to 
the body are separated and rejected from the body.,,9 This process of rejection, inherent to 
the anal-phase "establishes an outside that is never definitively separate - one that is 
always in the process of being posited. But in doing so, it already runs counter to the 
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unifying pleasure principle and sets up the most radical exteriority."l0 Thus by pointing to 
the associated pleasure experienced during the anal-phase Kristeva effaces a false 
dichotomy erected by Freud which sees the symbolic function separate from the 
generating process of pleasure of which it is produced. Kristeva goes one step further 
than Freud by combining both the rejection of the anal-phase and the consumption ofthe 
oral-phase through the notion of the drives and the pleasure therein associated. 
This is where one begins to understand the incredibly subversive potential of the 
Kristevan subject. Combining bodily expulsion and rejection (anal-phase) with "oral 
pleasure, disturb[s], indeed dismantle[s], the symbolic function."ll However the symbolic 
function is not obliterated entirely. The symbolic for Kristeva is paradoxically 
"maintained" in this unstable state. She explicitly states in Revolution in Poetic Language 
that "the heterogenous parceling of the symbolic, which underlies the symbolic's very 
constitution ... constantly undermines it even while maintaining it in process. ,,12 I 
emphasize "in process" here to draw attention to the fact that for Kristeva this dialectical 
play between oral/anal is always-already incomplete because of anal drives that go non-
repressed during the latter's phase. If we consider the fact that all of society and/or 
culture is "written" by subjects (e.g. law treaties, scientific paradigms, ethical codes of 
conduct, etc.) and that there exist non-repressed anality throughout these subjects and by 
extension society then, the "semiotic devices which run through modem phenotexts ... 
convey the struggle of a non-sublimated anality against the superego. Ideologically, this 
transformation of the signifying chain attacks, provokes, and unveils repressed sadism -
the anality underlying social apparatuses.,,13 There is an inherently subversive aspect to 
the factors of late modernity that Western subjects take to be constitutive of their being. 
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Various social institution and political arenas are not absolute in nature but are in fact 
constantly under threat of collapse, constantly in process/on trial as Kristeva says. 
Admitting limitations: rejection of the semiotic chora 
Deleuze and Guattari reject the semiotic chora (ordering of the drives) that 
Kristeva endorses. To quote A Thousand Plateaus where Deleuze and Guattari explicitly 
reject the chora: "It is obvious that there is no system of signs common to all strata, not 
even in the form of a semiotic "chora" theoretically prior to symbolization". 14 I want to 
point out here the fact that I recognize that Deleuze and Guattari would not perceive their 
rejecting the existence of the semiotic chora as a limitation to their philosophical system. 
All that I intend to establish by positing this reference of their rejection of the chora is to 
mark the fact that Deleuze and Guattari are indeed cognizant of their refusal to find value 
in the semiotic chora (i.e. the non-sublimated anality of the symbolic order). Because of 
this failure to find meaning in it they choose not to include it in their philosophical 
system. 
However, (and this is crucial to the critique of Deleuze and Guattari to follow 
throughout this thesis), because they do not find value in the semiotic chora and thus do 
not include it in their philosophical system, I argue that such a philosophical system is 
indeed limited in what it allows the late modern Western subject as far as that subject's 
relationships to the world, others, and indeed itself are concerned. I will fully introduce 
and thoroughly explain Deleuze and Guattari's rendition of the signifying process (i.e. the 
constitution of subjectivity qua assemblage-of-enunciation) in a later section; however, 
for now let me set the tone for Deleuze and Guattari's relationship to Kristeva. Not to put 
too fine a point on the matter (and by no means to I consider Deleuze and Guattari 
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adherents to the 'formalist' tradition) but Kristeva considers any philosophicaillinguistic 
system that does not acknowledge the existence of the chora to be severely impoverished. 
She posits that, "the formalist theory of symbolism simplifies the signifying process by 
seeing it only as a text (in the sense of a coded or deviant distribution of marks), without 
perceiving the drive rejection which produces it, straddling the corporeal and natural on 
the one hand, the symbolic and social on the other, and found in each of them 
specifically.,,15 As will be established later on, Deleuze and Guattari will champion a 
signifying process which adopts a version of Lacan' s understanding that the unconscious 
is structured like a language. What this means is that they hold that the subj ect is 
constituted by various strata of the symbolic and nothing more. Their approach entails 
being able to do certain things with the symbolic which would otherwise be attributed to 
the semiotic chora. This will also be fleshed out in full later. In short, these "postulates of 
linguistics" as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, illustrate what it is they understand 
for subjectivity to be predicated upon pure "affirmation" (a topic to be fleshed out later). 
However before engaging in a discussion on affirmation, I must first continue 
explaining Kristeva's interpretation of the signifying process by dissertating as to how 
this process is typical of her endorsement of the Hegelian dialectic vis the concept of 
"negativity. " 
Kristeva's concept of Negativity 
Kristeva begins by clarifying the distinction between the concept 'negativity' and 
its affiliate 'negation.' "The concept of negativity, distinct from that of nothingness 
(Nichts) and negation (Negation), figures as the indissoluble relation between an 
"ineffable" mobility and its "particular" determination".16 I will come back to negativity 
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in a moment, but first it is important to stress that 'negation' functions in or at a particular 
'moment' (to borrow from Hegel's lexicon) within self-consciousness. What this means 
is that negation marks a specific transition, literally a moment or space, wherein 
something that once was becomes something else. An example from Kojeve will serve 
well for this instance: 
In his lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology o/Spirit Kojeve begins where Hegel 
does, with Sense-Certainty or that which immediately presents itself to consciousness. 
Experience is predicated upon a constitutive loss for Hegel, suggests Kojeve, insofar as 
consciousness is completely "ek-static" to itself in the object that it perceives. Here 
perceiving and contemplating are recognized as the same. Kojeve writes, "The man who 
contemplates is "absorbed" by what he contemplates; the "knowing subject" "loses" 
himself in the object that is shown".17 Immediately it is evident that there is no clear 
distinction between subject and object. In this state of being man does not exist as subject 
qua subject, but for lack of better terminology, is alienated from himself embodied in an 
object-in-the-world. Kojeve's next move is to posit a movement or a return of 
consciousness back into itself from its dwelling in the world by means of the motivating 
factor of an internal desire. This shift of consciousness dwelling in-the-world to dwelling 
within-itself is a moment of negation. 
However, negativity differs radically from negation insofar as Kristeva mentions 
it to be the "indissoluble relation between an 'ineffable' mobility and its 'particular' 
determination." Negativity is that non-conceptual space which establishes the very 
possibility for the kind of movement or shift to take place which bears the name 
Negation. Kristeva writes: "negativity constitutes the logical impetus beneath the thesis 
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of negation and that of the negation of negation, but is identical to neither since it is, 
instead, the logical functioning of the movement that produces the theses.,,18 She grants 
that the concept itself has its Idealist origins with Hegel but was adopted later by the 
young-Hegelians and dialectical materialists for their project of creating a veritable 
materialist account of history. Marx writes in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, 
[T]he greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology and its fmal product, the dialectic of negativity as the 
moving and creating principle, is ... that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a process, 
objectification as loss of the object, as externalization and the transcendence of this 
externalization. This means, therefore, that he grasps the nature of labour and understands 
objective man, true, because real, man as the result of his own labour. 19 
Later in Revolution in Poetic Language she points out how negativity was moved from its 
ideal conceptualization in Hegel, through its materialist rendition in Marx, to being 
recognized as an inherent principle within all of life in Lenin. She writes, "Lenin 
underscores and accepts the notion of 'inherent negativity' as an objective principle - the 
principle of all physical and spiritual life - and not as a simple and 'subjective craving to 
shake and break down what is fixed and true' .,,20 
This objective principle of Lenin's, she claims, misses the point, as it only retains 
one element of the subject's 'negativization': "[H]is subordination, as a unit, to the social 
and natural process.,,21 What this amounts to is a weakened version of negativity insofar 
as it does away with the problem of the subject qua subject and "retain[s] only the 
process of substance in a Spinozistic sense or the process of modes ofproduction.,,22 I 
intentionally include this reference to Spinoza from Kristeva's text to indicate the 
similarities that may be highlighted between Spinoza's view and that of Deleuze and 
Guattari, both of which there are rational grounds for believing Kristeva is skeptical of 
the latter. The above materialist interpretation of negativity by Lenin is problematic for 
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Kristeva because she sees this move as essentializing negativity in a pan-universalist 
manner. Lenin's definition essentializes negativity in that he makes it an inherent 
property to all of material as well as spiritual nature; this totalizing nature qua one 
substance. This is equivalent to reifying the concept and thereby killing it, rendering 
negativity immobile. Negativity, in its true dialectal form "is precisely that which remains 
outside logic (as the signifier of a subject), what remains heterogenous to logic even 
while producing it through a movement of separation or rejection, something that has the 
necessary objectivity ofa law and can be seen as the logic ofmatter.,,23 This is what 
defines negativity as "the indissoluble relation between." Negativity cannot be reduced to 
a void of nothingness - a void wherein matter swirls about in organized chaos. Kristeva's 
concept of negativity makes possible the very dichotomy "matter/void." 
Kristeva attempts to differentiate her understanding of negativity from other 
interpretations which, like Lenin, she charges with misrepresenting the case: "We must 
emphasize that our notion of negativity should not be confused with ... that [which] 
modern philosophy has attempted to displace by substituting the notion of difference and 
repetition.,,24 The latter (i.e. difference and repetition) lack a definite indebtedness to 
history. What I mean to argue with respect to this point is that anything that is considered 
meaningful within Deleuze and Guattari' s signifying system is predicated only upon the 
prevailing social-symbolic system. That is to say, theirs is a position that is ignorant with 
respect to the historical processes that produced the prevailing symbolic. Kristeva stresses 
that "the sole function of our use of the term 'negativity' is to designate the process that 
exceeds the signifYing subject, binding him to the laws of objective struggles in nature 
and society. ,,25 I am not saying that Deleuze and Guattari are ignorant to the importance 
Ellis 12 
of history in the literal sense; simply that that they do not do justice with respect to 
history's involvement in the constitution of subjectivity. 
My motivation for including the above criticism of Deleuze and Guattari's 
notions of "difference" and "repetition" is to begin situating negativity relative to their 
notion of affirmation. To better introduce Kristeva's relationship to affirmation and 
thereby Deleuze and Guattari, consider what she has to say concerning Frege' s 
interpretation of negation. Kristeva writes that "it is undoubtedly Frege who most subtly 
elaborates the status of logical negation, concluding ... this operation is 'useless' in the 
realm of 'thought.' [ ... ] Thought does not include its own production: 'In thinking we do 
not produce thoughts, we grasp [fassen] them. , ,,26 Unless one is Bishop Berkeley, it is 
evident that we live in a concrete material world that is also indeed littered with ideology 
(i.e. ideas, or non-material entities); therefore this one-sided, purely eidetic view does not 
fully account for the "ultimate nature ofreality.,,27 "If thought is what does not involve 
production, it can include no negation that is not already an affirmation. ,,28 But one will 
object to my trajectory here and interject that Deleuze and Guattari situate the subject 
within a world populated with material as well as ideas and that theses entities are 
constituted in terms of production and anti-production. The point to take notice of is that 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of desiring-machines 'producing' and/or not-'producing' 
has fallen into the trap of a false dichotomy (i.e. production/anti-production) with no 
acknowledgement given with respect to what makes this production possible. 
In short, what Kristeva does not agree with in Deleuze and Guattari' s system is 
the way they account for 'breaks' and 'separations.' Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-
Oedipus that "in order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a 
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counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid.,,29 That is to say any appearance of a 
break or separation - in sort, a negation - is really nothing but a positive process: 
"production" setting the stage for something new to be produced, and so on ad infinitum. 
I will continue with a discussion on Deleuze and Guattari latter; however, the point that I 
want to make by drawing attention to this excerpt from Anti-Oedipus is that theirs is a 
philosophy of society based purely on affirmation. Kristeva re-interjects herself into the 
dialogue by stating: ''thought is always already the indistinguishableness of positive and 
negative; the negative is merely one of its possible components.,,30 Comparatively, any 
philosophy that bases itself on pure affirmation is only depicting one half of the equation. 
Kristeva's negativity goes beyond this totalizing way of depicting the cosmos. 
Finally I want to draw the link connecting Kristeva's concept of negativity to 
Freud and lastly commenting on what this means with respect to her notion of the 
subject-in-process. If, as Kristeva has derived from Frege, negation cannot exist internal 
to one's conscious thought, then "the only place negation exists is outside the subject's 
consciousness ... At this point it is evident that only a theory of the unconscious can 
propose a logical device within which 'negation' can be inscribed ... that which produces 
the signifying position itself .,,31 This is where Kristeva begins to blend her adoption of 
Hegelian negativity with Freud's thoroughgoing materialism. "The logic exposed above 
will become materialist when, with the help of Freud's discovery, one dares think 
negativity as the very movement o/heterogenous matter.,,32 It is at this point that I will 
briefly comment on Freud's article On Negation, and show its elliptical reference to 
Kristeva's subject-in-process. 
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Prior to Kristeva, Freud put forth a case for negation's importance for the onset of 
intellectual life. In his article On Negation Freud postulated a mechanism that made it 
possible for the infant to function in the world as a being predicated on symbolic 
pragmatism. Negation is interpreted in Freud as a symbolic representative for allowing 
the subject-matter of the unconscious to become manifest to the subject in analysis. Freud 
writes: 
There is a most convenient method upon which one can sometimes obtain a necessary light upon a 
piece of unconscious and repressed material. 'What', one asks, 'would you consider was about the 
most unlikely thing in the world in that situation? ... If the patient falls into the trap and names 
what he thinks most incredible, he almost invariably in so doing makes the correct admission?3 
The example goes on to argue that via the analysand's confession that, for example, "that 
was not my mother in my dream", the analyst is free to interpret the spoken material. 
The significance of the act of negation is that the repressed material could only be 
brought into discussion by way of the negation. This is a particularly good example 
(using that of the mother) for the pre-objectal mother, or the semiotic chora, is that which 
has been repressed due to the child's separation from the mother and entrance into the 
symbolic (more on this later). It is here where Freud is careful to separate out the 
"intellectual" virtues of negation compared to that of the "affective". 
The act of stating a claim in the negative, (e.g. making a negative judgment as 
Freud puts it), is the only way for the subject-matter or the "image" of what has been 
repressed (or that which is outside of consciousness) to enter consciousness. However, 
the actual content of that which the image stands for is still repressed. The "actual 
content" pertains to the affective and the "image" the intellectual. By stating something in 
the negative I allow for that which is negated by the symbolic to be acknowledged as 
such. It is in a sense, at least insofar as Freud understands, an acceptance of that which 
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has repressed while at the same time understanding that the repressed still remains 
repressed as something forever unknowable and lost to me. Yet, we remain unsatisfied 
with this notion until such an attempt has been made to give form and coherence to this 
'outside,' no matter how futile such an attempt might prove. Freud continues: 
A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression; the 'No' in which it is expressed 
is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin, as it were ... By the help of the symbol of 
negation, the thinking-process frees itself from the limitations ofre~ression and enriches itself 
with the subject-matter without which it could not work efficiently. 4 
The take home point in this digression into Freud is that negation literally symbolizes, or 
in any case attempts to symbolize, that which is wholly repressed and outside of 
consciousness. This wholly 'outsideness,' relative to consciousness (the Freudian 
unconscious), is similar to but not identical to negativity proper in Kristeva (but that 
would be to reify negativity within one side of a dualism: e.g. conscious/unconscious). 
On the contrary Kristeva's negativity works at the border(s) of the conscious and 
unconscious. The subject's relationship to both these realms is what characterizes 
Kristeva's concept of the "subject-in-process." 
The Kristevan subject is one that is constitutively indebted to both modalities of 
the signifying process: the symbolic as well as the semiotic; one is never exclusively one 
or the other. The subject-in-process is at once constituted by the objective physical laws 
that situate it within a social community (e.g. family, culture, language, etc.) as well as by 
those 'laws' which remain forever outside of the logic of these social laws and yet allow 
for the very possibility of their coming-into-being (e.g. biology, matter, ruptures, decay, 
etc.). The following excerpt from Revolution in Poetic Language may help to polish off 
this introduction to the concept of negativity. The subject-in-process lives a 
"simultaneous existence [along] the boundary (which is the One) and the a-reasonable, a 
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relative, a-mediating crossing of that boundary; or the possibility of the constitution-
unconstitution of One meaning-non-meaning, passing through categorical boundaries 
('inside,' 'one,' 'multiple,' etc.) which is precisely what rejection brings about.,,35 Before 
moving onward, notice the inclusion of the term 'multiple' that Kristeva considers a 
conceptual boundary. One might choose, as I will later, to draw the connection between 
this notion ofthe 'multiple' and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a "multiplicity." Might 
not the latter's "multiplicity" be considered a "conceptual boundary" brought up and 
developed by the former (Kristeva)? A concept that is surpassed by Kristeva's concept of 
negativity? 
Part 2: Psychoanalytic contextualizations: Freud, Lacan, and Klein 
Freud 
The thought of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, was rooted in a 
thorough-going materialism of late German romanticism. This period signaled a crisis in 
the traditional understanding of what it was to be human. Charles Darwin's theory of 
evolution by means of natural selection played a great role in fueling this crisis. Darwin 
argued that human beings were not divinely created qua ready-made-human, but were 
instead the precipitate of a long gradual process of material evolution, subject to the 
random catastrophes of the surrounding environment. Freud's project became one that 
attempted to reconcile the materiality of Darwin (and the individual-subject's birth into 
this materiality) while trying to retain the singular aspects of the subject's existence that 
escaped pure materiality. Adam Phillips, in his book Promises, promises: Essays on 
Psychoanalysis and Literature illustrates this sketch of Freud, "The psychoanalytic 
theory he found himself writing was science that sometimes sounded like literature. The 
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form chosen was the scientific treatise, the genre endorsed by the profession he wrote for; 
but the so-called content smacked of poetic drama, or fiction". 36 Freud's case studies 
report the concrete material conditions of a subject's life (science) while simultaneously 
chronicling the subject's accounting with respect to that experience (art) which reads 
essentially as a fiction. 37 
Upon being born into this thorough materiality a la Darwin, Freud postulated that 
the primordial experience of the infant is such that the infant does not recognize a 
distinction between its body and the surrounding milieu. There is no subject/object 
distinction, no interior/exterior; simply the "booming and buzzing" flow of experience. 
From his article On Narcissism Freud outlines how during this stage of ontogeny there is 
no subjectivity per se with respect to the infant: "I may point out that we are bound to 
suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; 
the ego has to be developed".38 For example, the pre-subjective condition of the infant 
(Primary Narcissism) is such that when the feeling of hunger is "felt" by the infant, it is 
not felt by the infant as "in its stomach", but "felt in general". There is a painful tension 
afoot throughout the "booming and buzzing" that the infant desires to quell, or return to 
its original pleasurable state by suckling at the breast. 
In his Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Fourth Lecture) Freud outlines that, "the 
child's first choice of an object ... is directed in the first instance to all those who look 
after it, but these soon give place to its parents".39 At first the child is thought to take both 
parents as love objects, but this soon gives way to a privileging of one; for infant boys it 
is the mother, and for infant girls it is the father. This is based on "some indication from 
its parents, whose affection bears the clearest characteristics of a sexual activity, even 
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though of one that is inhibited in its aim". 40 This is the foundation of Freud's philosophy 
of love,41 triangulated under the umbrella myth of Oedipus. Freud continues to add that 
the seeds of this psychic structure will "continue to exercise a great and lasting influence 
from the unconscious" and is thus "no less actively at work in other regions of mental 
life".42 Freud suggested that the resultant identity (ego) that was carved out of this 
inchoate pre-subjective narcissistic enclave was the product of the Oedipus complex. 
Freud's position was that the child's repressed sexual desires, triangulated 
between hislher parents, structured the psychic life of the individual. Freud came to this 
conclusion after observing his grandson (Ernst) playing with a reel attached to a piece of 
string. This is Freud'sfort-da example. Freud observed that as his grandson would 
repetitiously toss the reel over the edge of a table, after which he would utter, 
"fort"('gone'). He would then regain possession of the reel by pulling on the thread until 
the reel emerged from below the edge of the table and upon the reel becoming visible 
would shout, "Da!"('there!'). In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud summarizes thus, 
"Throwing away the object so that it was 'gone' might satisfy an impulse of the child's, 
which was suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother's going away 
from him [ ... ] on the contrary he made it quite clear that he had no desire to be disturbed 
in his sole possession of his mother".43 Freud posited that this game was a symbolic 
expression by the young child to give form and coherence to his feelings toward his 
mother: simultaneously desiring her presence and absence. Freud's grandson behaved in 
this way because, as Freud would postulate for all infants, the child has "suffered a loss in 
regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego".44 The ego for 
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Freud is founded upon the loss of our primordial love-object during the stage of primary 
narcissism. Essentially the ego is established through the mourning of this loss. 
The Oedipus complex, for Freud, fortifies the subj ect as such by shoring up the 
core of what defines subjectivity. Freud's final topology, characterized famously by the 
Super Ego, Ego, and Id is the rubric under which the Oedipus complex is most commonly 
recognized. All three aspects to this topology, although perhaps not directly intended by 
its author, served to frustrate the traditional western Cartesian model of subjectivity. 
Kristeva will adopt this Freudian topology; however, she will modify it by choosing to 
focus on pre-Oedipal structures of subjectivity, of which she will refer to as "love", 
"loss", and "abjection". These three moments, albeit identified independently of one 
another, in fact, operate -- structurally -- in concert. Before proceeding with a discussion 
of how Kristeva's reconfigurations of the structures of subjectivity are fleshed out, I must 
outline the contributions made by Jacques Lacan, who was also a significant influence 
upon Kristeva as well as on Deleuze and Guattari' s thought. 
Lacan 
Lacan's "return to Freud" heralded a re-creation of the Freudian paradigm to free 
it in a sense from its borderline biological determinism. The unconscious for Lacan is 
structured "like a language" and this linguistic rendition of the unconscious has to do 
with internalizing the language (desire) of the other as one's own. Bruce Fink writes in 
The Lacanian Subject, 
a child is thus born into a preestablished place in its parents' linguistic universe, a space often 
prepared many months, if not years, before the child sees the light of day. And most children are 
bound to learn the language spoken by their parents, which is to say that, in order to express their 
wishes, they are virtually obliged to go beyond the crying stage ... and try to say what they want 
in so many words, that is, in a way that is comprehensible to their primary caretakers. Their wants 
are, however, molded in that very process, for the words they are obliged to use are not their own 
and do not necessarily correspond to their own particular demands. 45 
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Freud never explicitly provided a model for how the unconscious worked outside of 
expressing that one could detect its presence by observing the use of jokes, slips of the 
tongue, and dreams.46 Lacan's linguistic interpretation of Freud's Oedipus complex 
culminates with this understanding of the unconscious. The words and desires we 
assumed to be ours are in fact, according to Lacan, not ours at all, but those of the Other. 
Since we are unaware that we have internalized these words and desires, of which we are 
conscious, there is no telling what we have internalized that we are unconscious of and 
that regardless exert some effect upon our actions. However, Lacan's reworking of 
Freud's paradigm goes much deeper than this and must be fleshed out in full through an 
explanation of the "real", "imaginary", and the "symbolic", as well as his understanding 
of the "mirror stage". 
The child, for Lacan (as for Freud), does not experience a distinction between 
itself and its environment upon being born. This is the stage of psychological 
development which is labeled the "real" in Lacan. Lacan writes in his Bcrits, "This 
fragmented body .. .is regularly manifested in dreams when the movement of an analysis 
reaches a certain level of aggressive disintegration of the individual".47 The real 
prefigures the formation of the subject as such, and is structurally similar to Freud's 
primary narcissism insofar as the real is characterized by what Lacan considers a "lack of 
a lack". This statement makes sense in the light of knowing that for Lacan, the ego stems 
from lack; thus prior to the formation of an ego there is a veritable lack of lack. For lack 
to exist as such there would have to be a subjective experience oflack. Since there is no 
subject yet to experience a lack, the pre-subjective state of being, the real, is a lack of 
lack. 48 The child eventually exits the real and enters the "imaginary" stage of 
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development when it recognizes that the mother is a wholly Other or a completely 
separate being. This occurs, perhaps through the absence of the breast. Some "event" in 
any case transpires which signals this split. 
The imaginary is an ambiguous stage of development wherein the infant is caught 
in a stage where it recognizes that it is separate; however, it is separate without any 
discernible identity. The child is neither nothing, nor something. (Kristeva will return to 
this phenomenon of ambiguity in her discussion of "abjection"). The imaginary lingers 
until the child stumbles upon a moment of "stability" when it encounters its own image. 
This is what is called the "mirror stage" in Lacan. It is thought to occur between 6-18 
months of development. The child recognizes a correlation between the movements of its 
"body" and the image of what it now understands as itself in a "mirror", or "mirror" 
equivalent (for this model is not occulocentric), which it internalizes as its ego. Lacan 
writes, "the moment at which the mirror stage comes to an end, inaugurates, through 
identification with the imago of one's semblable and the drama of primordial jealousy ... 
the dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations".49 The image 
that the child seeks to identify with is only meant to "fill" the lack that is ever present to 
this child since its primordial separation from the mother. 
The attempt to fill this lack will be extended to language and the "symbolic" by 
the introduction of the "father". The father for Lacan, unlike Freud, is not necessarily the 
biological father or any human figure proper (although it could be: i.e. judge or teacher). 
The father is literally nothing more than a "symbolic" figure that stands in as the "love" 
interest of the mother. This symbolic signifier is called The "Name-of-the-Father" by 
Lacan. Fink tells us that, "In Seminar IV, Lacan goes so far as to suggest that the only 
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signifier that is able to serve a paternal function in the case of Freud's "Little Hans" is the 
signifier 'horse",.5o Due to this admiration on the part of the mother for the father, the 
child then learns to identify with the father who ushers in the possibility of symbolically 
expressing one's desire through language, or simply a symbolic system. This is Lacan's 
linguistic reading of Freud's Oedipal complex. The mother is that which is non-
symbolizable in-itself but instead makes possible the symbolism of the father. The 
subject is nestled in-between these two like Oedipus. The controversy and struggle over 
the Oedipal structure of subjectivity has proved fruitful for many writers since Freud. 
This thesis chooses to focus on three such thinkers: Kristeva as well as Deleuze and 
Guattari. 51 I will now turn toward Kristeva's corpus. 
Klein 
In similar fashion to Freud and Lacan, Melanie Klein factored quite strongly into 
Kristeva's contributions to philosophy and psychoanalysis. Recalling Kristeva's criticism 
that Lacan and his followers to have forgotten the value of the Freudian drives, she turns 
to Klein who, compared to other psychoanalysts, remained truest to Freud. 
Klein endorsed Freud's structures of primary narcissism, noting that "the baby's 
first object oflove and hate - his mother - is both desired and hated with all the intensity 
and strength that is characteristic of the early urges of the baby.,,52 Identical to Freud's 
hypothesis that the infans does not recognize any distinction between its body and the 
mother's body (i.e. any distinction between internal/external) the in/ans does not 
recognize a distinction in the psychic economy of "love" and "hate." These two emotions 
are ambiguously intertwined in the "booming and buzzing" of pre-Oedipal development. 
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"When a baby feels frustrated at the breast, in his phantasies he attacks this breast; but if 
he is being gratified by the breast, he loves it and has fantasies of a pleasant kind in 
relation to it. In his aggressive phantasies he wishes to bite up and to tear up his mother 
and her breast, and to destroy her also in other ways."S3 This is what constitutes the 
"schizo-paranoid" phase for Klein. Following this phase the baby becomes aware that its 
endeavor to destroy the 'bad' breast, which is its source of anxiety and hate, is in turn 
damaging with respect to the 'good' breast, which is its sources of pleasure and 
gratification. Since at this phase of development an 'imaginary' substitute for the breast is 
just as gratifying as the actual breast, the baby will conjure up phantasies that it is in 
process of repairing the good breast which it is subconsciously aware it had been 
damaging. Klein: 
If the baby has, in his aggressive phantasies, injured his mother by biting and tearing her up, he 
may soon build up phantasies that he is putting the bits back together again and repairing her. 
This, however, does not quite do away with his fears of having destroyed the object which, as we 
know, is the one whom he loves and needs most, and on whom he is entirely dependent. 54 
This 'reparation' is characteristic of the "depressive" phase. Klein refers to this phase as 
"depressive" because the infant qua subject is thrown into a state of guilt which carries 
over into its adult life which haunts it with a feeling that its can never fully repair the 
damage that it once inflicted upon the (pre-objectal-) mother. Quite literally this pre-
objectal mother is forever lost to the now fully conscious child-subject and thus any 
return to this pre-subjective state to repair any damages is impossible. Nonetheless, Klein 
writes, "In my view, these basic conflicts profoundly influence the course and force of 
the emotional lives of grown-up individuals."ss This notion of the loss of the pre-objectal 
mother is what ties Klein's psychoanalytic theory to Kristeva's notion of negativity. 
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In her book on Klein, Kristeva shows how these elements of Klein's thought are 
in line with the notion of negativity that she adopts from Hegel. Kristeva writes, "the 
judging subject cannot exist without a lost object: by relying on memory, 'I' can signify 
the object only as it is -lost for the 'ego who, as a result oflosing the object, is held out 
as a 'subject' [ ... J it is a 'dialectical' negation.,,56 The loss of the pre-objectal mother sets 
the subject in motion ('process') such that -- albeit in a depressive manner fraught with 
hauntings of 'reparation' - the subject is forever in the process of establishing 
connections with others, itself, and objects in the world only to transcend these 
connections because of an impending sense of guilt and failure. This point is reiterated in 
Revolution in Poetic Language when Kristeva writes: "Self-consciousness denies the 
object in order to return to itself, and loses sight of it only as a simple substance to realize 
its own unity with itself.,,57 The only implication, however, for the Kristevan subject-in-
process is that because during pre-Oedipal development there was no distinction between 
self/Other, through the act oflosing the other (pre-objectal mother) the subject loses an 
aspect of itself. 
The aspect of itself which the subject has lost by means of its loss of the pre-
objectal mother is not something empirical; it is indeed "imaginative," and thus cannot be 
grasped by any concrete means. That this lost aspect of the subject is 'imaginative' has to 
do with the fact that for Freud the intellectual and affective realms were dissociated from 
one another; the former made possible by the negation of the latter. Citing Hyppolite 
Kristeva writes, "the affective realm is only 'mythical' .,,58 What this means is that the lost 
aspect of oneself, the pre-objectal mother, can never present itselfto one's consciousness 
as complete. To further elaborate upon this point, the human subject cannot imagine that 
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which preceded the loss of the pre-objectal mother since at that stage there would have 
been nothing to remember. However, post-loss, the subject (in-process) constantly 
conjures up imaginary relationships that it 'feels' will satiate its desire to 'repair' its 
damaged narcissism. Insofar as these constructs or the self are imaginary in nature and 
forever in the process of being erected and demolished simultaneously they are to be 
considered illustrative of the process with which Kristeva interprets the late modem 
subject. 
Part 3: Lack and Loss, Or the theoretical differences between Kristeva and Lacan 
Given the benefit of having just discussed Klein's influence upon Kristeva's ideas 
it is important to delve deeper and explore how Kristeva's adoption of Klein's notion of 
"loss" differs (and itself is influenced by) Lacan's notion of "lack." Lacan wrote in Bcrits 
that, "he [the subject] speaks now, but his speech has become suspicious because it is 
merely a response to the failure of his silence, when faced with the perceived echo of his 
own nothingness".59 The ego is a "symbol" which is frustrating to maintain the status of 
insofar as it is arbitrary and always under threat of dissolution, for Lacan. Likewise 
Kristeva shows that as part of a linguistic discourse our subjectivity is always under 
threat of collapse and dissolution. She writes in Revolution: "The semiotic's breach of the 
symbolic in so-called poetic practice can probably be ascribed to the very unstable yet 
forceful positing of the thetic". 60 The "thetic" in this case would serve as the act of 
naming the semiotic chora. The subject, coming-to-be a subject as such, is coaxed into 
the symbolic and commits veritable "matricide" by repressing the semiotic chora by 
utilizing language, the "symbolic". This is parallel to Freud's Oedipus complex situation, 
insofar as the pre-subjective infant has no desire to leave the milieu of primary 
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narcissism. Upon recognizing that the mother is not present the infant seeks satisfaction 
in the symbolic for that which it has lost in the pre-symbolic. This is the entrance into 
subjectivity proper for Kristeva. These are what one might consider the similarities 
between the two thinkers. 
However, for Lacan the infant is left to give symbolic representation to the "lack" 
which taints its existence post-Mirror stage. Due to the fact that the infant has no 
symbolic way of knowing what it was to exist prior to the need for symbolic 
representation of itself (since that which is non-symbolizable cannot be represented using 
symbols) it is doomed to a life of frustration in its attempts to name the unnamable -
itself (ego) as separate from the mother. Thus "meaning" proper for Lacan is not possible 
outside the symbolic or that which would count as Kristeva's semiotic). This is where 
Kristeva differs significantly from the Lacanian school of thought, as she sees the 
semiotic as a conveyance of non-symbolic meaning. 
What is it exactly, though, that counts as "lack" in Lacan? Furthermore, how does 
this lack differ from Kristeva's (via Klein's) notion of the "loss" of the pre-objectal 
mother? First it must be stated that the concept of lack in Lacan is intimately tied to his 
understanding of "desire." In Revolution in Poetic Language Kristeva tells us that 
"defined by Lacan as 'the metonomy of the want-to-be' [manque a etre], desire organizes 
its logical structure on what can be called nothingness or the zero in logic.,,61 The use of 
the term 'metonomy' is meant to signify the connection that one signifier has with respect 
to another signifier that can be used synonymously in its place. From the Greek 
etymology meaning "change of name" Lacan's "metonymy" recalls Freud's theorization 
of 'condensation and displacement.' Whatever the case, desire is the ceaseless migration 
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of the subject moving from one imago (image of the ego) to another (or signifier to 
signifier) without there ever occurring a connection to the subaltern factors of their 
subjectivity. What this means, with reference specifically to Lacan, is that the "symbolic" 
and the "real" will never meet. For lack of a better expression, the two seemingly run 
parallel to one another ad infinitum, their relationship negotiated by the "imaginary." In 
Kristeva, on the other hand, a meaningful connection is experienced within the subject 
through the act of positing the ''thetic.'' 
Quite literally, Kristeva says, "we shall call [that] which produces the positing of 
signification, a the tic phase.,,62 However it is not simply the case the thetic is mono-axial; 
that is to say that it does not merely "contain[s] the object as well as the proposition, and 
the complicity between them.,,63 In linguistic terminology this would be a "synchronic" 
analysis of the thetic phase. The thetic is, however, intersected by another axis, one that 
would combine an element of "diachronicity" to the matrix of signification. This axis is 
the notion of "process" or what produces the thetic in the here and now. Kristeva credits 
Freud with having provided the groundwork for subsequent theorists in linguistics and 
psychoanalysis to think the relationship between the "thetic" and "process." 
Lacan's notion of desire does not allow for this connection ofthe symbolic to its 
own production insofar as Lacan elevates the subject out of the Freudian world of the 
drives and into the world of purely social "symbolic" signification. "[D]esire takes up the 
logic of Hegelian negativity through the notions of the first Freudian topography 
[condensation and displacement] but raises them out of their biological and material 
entrenchment into the domain of social praxis where 'social' means 'signifying' .,,64 But 
this elevation to the "social praxis" is understood by Lacan the ''function of [a] 
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misrecognition,,,65(meconaissance) insofar as the function of the social is a futile practice 
of erecting/demolishing essentially false images of the self. Thus Kristeva posits that in 
Lacan: 
The negativity ... positing the never saturated subject in process/on trial ... will be replaced by a 
nothingness - the 'lack' [manque] that brings about the unitary being of the subject. Desire will be 
seen as an always already accomplished subjugation ofthe subject to lack: it will serve to 
demonstrate the development of the signifier, never the heterogenous process that questions the 
psychosomatic orders.66 
Here it becomes evident in Kristeva's interpretation of Lacan that he creates a subject that 
is wholly defined by only one side of a dichotomy: lack (compare to the symbolic, which 
attempts to fill the lacking subject). "The phallus totalizes the effects of signifieds as 
having been produced by the signifier.,,67 In any case, the subject is lacking-
ontologically. Having heretofore introduced and explained Lacan's notion of lack I will 
now further differentiate it from Kristeva's concept of loss. 
Lack, loss, and the difference in-between 
The relative difference between Lacan's lack and Kristeva's loss can best be 
fleshed out by first making a reference to the notion of "empty signifiers." The 
relationship between signifiers and signifieds is thought to be, thanks to the work of 
Saussure "arbitrary." That is to say, there is no natural connection between word and 
world. For Lacan, what this means is that the subject, constituted by the signifier, is 
essentially "empty," or predicated on lack. However, by introducing the semiotic into the 
mix, Kristeva provides a motivation for the production and specific utilization of such 
signifiers. She replaces the notion that signifiers are "arbitrary" with the idea that they 
"articulate." She does not mean to suggest that indeed signifiers signify something 
natural in the world that can be pointed to empirically; she only means to suggest that 
signifiers have a certain motivation about them insofar as they are connected to the 
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semiotic rhythms of the body. Kristeva finds the "principle of this motivation in the 
Freudian notion of the unconscious insofar as the theories of drives ... and primary 
processes ... can connect 'empty signifiers' to psychosomatic functionings.,,68 Such a 
linguistic theory is "clearly indebted to the positions of ... Melanie Klein in particular,,,69 
the instinctual drives, as well as vocalic and intonational differentiations that other more 
formalist theories exclude. 70 
Through linking the semiotic drives of the body to the social functioning of the 
symbolic Kristeva comes to argue over Lacan that there is a certainjouissance 
experienced by the subject that the latter's subject is incapable of experiencing. This 
jouissance is experienced in the process of expressing oneself through poetic 
language/writing. 
This acute pleasure therefore coincides with a loss, a separation from the body, and the isolating of 
objects outside it. Before the body itself is posited as a detached alterity, and hence the real object, 
this expulsion of objects is the subject's fundamental experience of separation - a separation 
which is not a lack, but a discharge, and which, although privative, arouses pleasure 71 
I want to draw the reader's attention to the emphasis placed upon the term "discharge" 
and the association it shares with the act of rejecting or expelling the pre-objectal mother 
during primary narcissism. The expulsion or discharging of poetic language from ones 
body conjures up the archaic drives that traverse and penetrate one's body, especially 
those orifices and sphincters, such as the anus (Kristeva has explained that this is the last 
sphincter to come under ordering and repression) which we know are associated with 
destruction. Compare this to Klein's "hate" aspect of the "schizo-paranoid" phase and the 
pleasure that is derived via the biting and tearing at the mother's breast. The fact of the 
matter remains that in Kristeva there occur upsurges of the semiotic in the field of the 
symbolic in the form of the thetic. Furthermore the thetic does not pivot upon a single 
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(synchronic) axis but is intersected with a historical "diachronic" axis. Read 
psychoanalytically: this "historical" reference is projected into the "deep structures" of 
the subject's constitution, that is to say the pre-Oedipal phase where the semiotic chora 
reigns. This association with the semiotic and the jouissance that it entails is what 
differentiates Kristeva's notion of "loss" from the Lacanian subject which is forever kept 
from accessing its own "real." 
The altered notion of loss that Kristeva advances provides her with an advantage 
over that of Lacan (and by extension Deleuze and Guattari as I will describe in detail 
later) insofar as for Lacan a certain kind of subject emerges: "the subject, precisely, of 
desire, who lives at the expense of his desires, ever in search of a lacking object. The sole 
source of his praxis is this quest oflack, death, and language."n Lacan's subject becomes 
reified as a subject of desire (or lack). There is no "process" inherent to the subjects 
being, s/he is simply "circumambulating" this lack, to borrow a technical term from 
Lacan's VII Seminar. Kristeva posits that Lacan succumbed to the same problematic that 
Heidegger fell victim to when he affirmed his subject, a "Being-in-the-World, " qua 
"man" as the kind of entity that was characterized as such based on their relationship to 
cura ["care"]' In either case, Kristeva claims, "negativity is thereby tamed in a subject 
who is posited there only as a subject anguished by an inaccessible sociality or 
transcendence.,,73 The same is true with respect to Kristeva's advantages over Klein 
whose emphasis on the loss of the pre-objectal mother shares in a notion of materiality 
that has its grounding in the economy of Freud's Verneinung [negation].74 This is not the 
same as Kristevan negativity per se. 
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Pertaining to the potential advantage that this altered notion of loss (proper to 
Kristeva) has over Deleuze and Guattari, one might choose to refer to her comments in 
the 'prolegomenon' to her Revolution in Poetic Language: 
Deleuze and Guattari, are right to stress the de structuring and a-signifying machine of the 
unconscious. [ ... ] What is readily apparent, however, is that their examples of 'schizophrenic 
flow' are usually drawn from modern literature, in which the 'flow' itself exists only through 
language, appropriating and displacing the signifier to practice within it the heterogenous 
generating of the 'desiring-machines,75 
Deleuze and Guattari's capacity to stake their position that the subject is constituted 
purely symbolically (with no reference to the semiotic) is provided the very grounds for 
being staked in virtue of a fluid negativity. Their "rejection" of the semiotic is itself a 
moment of negation which can only take place in an un-namable external realm (Freud's 
unconscious) which itself is postulated on the premise of an ineffable bridge connecting 
the two (internal and external realms). In short Deleuze and Guattari's interpretation of 
the symbolic is such that it too possesses the properties of the semiotic, which would be 
an inherent contradiction. Through the positing of the "fouth term" of the dialectic, 
"negativity," Kristeva salvages subjectivity from becoming reified as "multiplicity." 
Part 4: Affirmation and Force: From that 'Noble Sage' to Rodez 
There is however another tradition with respect to negativity that has been 
philosophized upon since before the early modems; it is the concept of 'affirmation.' 
Thinkers who have been affiliated with affirmation, like Hegel is associated with 
negativity, include: Spinoza, Nietzsche, Klossowski, and Artaud. I will contextualize the 
concept of affirmation through an exegesis of the tradition since Spinoza very shortly; 
however for now let me set the scene for how I understand the concepts to differ 
generally. 
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Deleuze and Guattari' s particular sympathies with regard to affirmation and its 
role in the constitution of subjectivity has to do with the developments that emerged out 
of the "new psychoanalysis" following Klein, of which Lacan was the leading 
figurehead.76 Kristeva explains how these intellectuals considered talk of the pre-Oediapl 
phase of development to be meaningless. Consider Lacan's depiction of the "real" (Le. 
the name he denotes the pre-Oedipal with) as that which resists representation. Also 
recall from Lacan that existential meaning only exists through the manipulation of the 
"symbolic." In any case, Lacan and his followers set aside the pre-Oedipal and the 
domain of "primary symbolization, which they considered to be 'mythical'.'.77 Pertaining 
specifically to the theoretical needs within psychoanalysis and philosophy Lacan et al. 
reformulated Freud's Oedipus complex in terms of the newly established "Name-of-the-
Father.,,78 In short, talk of the pre-Oedpal became a moot point for this group. Any 
progressive or affirmative advantages gained by means of a detour through the "semiotic" 
(negativity) were no longer accorded the same value. One could thus conceptualize a 
philosophical system which utilizes only the properties of the "symbolic" and is thus 
based purely on affirmation. That being said, like negativity with respect to Hegel, Marx, 
and Freud, affirmation shares a history deeply laden throughout Western thought. It is 
now that I will turn to an exegesis of these contributors. 
Spinoza 
This is a rather depressing prognosis with respect to human subjectivity and 
civilization in general. Thinking in terms of negation and negativity was challenged early 
on in the early modern era - Deleuze argues - by Spinoza. In contrast to a humanism 
characterized by negation, Deleuze sees in Spinoza a philosophy of "joy". The individual 
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is not fated to endure the faults of its own constitution, which would imply 'passivity', 
but instead is empowered with the ability to 'activity' construct itself: 
There is no Good or Evil, but there is good and bad [ ... ] That individual will be called good 
... who strives, insofar as he is capable, to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees 
with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with his [ ... ] That 
individual will be called bad, or servile, or weak, or foolish, who lives haphazardly, who is content 
to undergo the effects of his encounters, but wails and accuses every time the effect undergone 
does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence.79 
Spinoza insinuates that the human subject falsely "moralizes" experience through 
internalizing a sense of guilt or inevitability in light of the calamity of which it is 
surrounded. However this is a misguided perspective on experience Deleuze argues on 
behalf of Spinoza. The ethical life, or 'joy" of life is to be found "in the correlate of 
speculative affirmation", 80 as opposed to negation and negativity. Nietzsche later adopts 
this notion of affirmation in what Deleuze refers to as his "anti-Hegelianism".81 
Nietzsche 
Nietzsche is the quintessential philosopher that Deleuze and Guattari draw upon 
most significantly in developing their philosophy of subjectivity. Deleuze reads 
Nietzsche's interpretation of Hegel's master/slave dialectic in terms of 'forces'. "In 
Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a negative 
element in the essence". 82 Recall from the exegesis on Koj eve's interpretation of Hegel 
that the relative positions of the master and slave are established in light of one of the 
participants in the 'fight to the death' recanting their pitch to be recognized as the 
essential value (self-consciousness; 'slave'). This participant, the would-be-slave, fails to 
go "to the limit of its power",83 and thus fails to become an 'active' force. Instead the 
participant becomes 'reactive'. This is equivalent to the 'bad' individual explained above 
in the Spinoza. 
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The problem that Nietzsche perceives in the dialectic and thus negativity in 
general is thus: by structuring relations in terms of conflict or opposition (i.e. 
master/slave) negativity and the dialectic constitute a state of nihilism; that is to say, it 
pre-ordains a world "in which life is accused, judged, and condemned". 84 The dialectic 
"presupposes its failure and impotence". 85 In short it presupposes a decadent and 
'reactive' existence - which is equivalent to 'slave' or 'herd' mentality, or as Nietzsche 
puts it: "descending" as opposed to "ascending" existence. Deleuze writes that, 
"Nietzsche's "yes" is opposed to the dialectical "no"; affirmation to dialectical negation; 
difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour". 86 For 
Nietzsche the human condition, the all-too-human condition, is to be reactive. This 
condition of reactivity is in a sense a self-incurred condition of strife and misery. The 
subject literally inflicts pain and hardship upon itself needlessly. Nietzsche contests that 
we can always will another way; an affirmative way. However we do not chose this. We 
chose to keep this affirmative power 'within' repressed. The following few comments 
will lead into my discussion on Klossowski and Artaud. 
Nietzsche's criticism of science, mostly biology, is that the way we practice 
science as a method of epistemological enquiry is determined in the way our 
consciousness is structured: reactively. "What happens is that science follows the paths of 
consciousness, relying entirely on other reactive forces; the organism is always seen from 
the petty side, from the side of its reactions". 87 Nietzsche criticizes Darwin for casting the 
organism as the result of a passive process as compared to that of Lamarck who foretold 
an evolutionary structure wherein the organism was the sole conductor of it's bodily 
constitution. I want to highlight this mentioning of the 'body' and elliptically refer back 
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to the master/slave dialectic for a moment. Both participants in the 'fight-to-the-death' 
were solely focused on being recognized as self-conscious and thus being elevated above 
their raw, natural, biological- bodily -- being. Thus the body becomes repressed. 
To quote from Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche writes, "behind your thoughts 
and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage - whose name is 
self. In your body he dwells; he is your body".88 The active forces of the body have been 
repressed by the passivity of consciousness, by the ego. As far as Deleuze interprets 
Nietzsche, the ethical life (Spinoza) ought to be one that pursues active engagements. But 
what are these 'active' powers? Deleuze answers by appealing to Nietzsche: 
"appropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating - these are the characteristic of 
active force".89 It is to Klossowski's and Artaud's respective adoptions of these 'active' 
forces that I would now like to turn. 
Klossowski 
Pierre Klossowski was vital in bringing Nietzsche to France (similar to Kojeve 
and Hegel). This was accomplished mainly through his book Nietzsche and the Vicious 
Circle. Therein Klossowski advances his argument that Nietzsche's introduction of the 
"eternal return" is his most enigmatic concept. "To a significant degree, Nietzsche and 
the Vicious Circle responds to and enlarges a problematic set up by Nietzsche throughout 
his oeuvre: the relation of the body to language".9o For both Nietzsche and Klossowski 
language emerges as a product of the body but simultaneously represses the body. This is 
due to the economic value of language and the sign. The human subject achieves great 
things through communicating information to and from other individuals. I 'ask' a 
question; I am 'answered' in the others' response. However, the language that is involved 
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in the economic system of exchanging signs produces false representations of the body. 
"Language encapsulates, but cannot encapsulate, the material conditions of its 
production".91 The material conditions for the production oflanguage are the impulses 
that drive the feral rhythms of the body. 
Klossowski considers these impulses, as does Niezsche, to be of singular value; 
completely unnamenable to economic exchange. "For Klossowski, the exchange of signs 
- both between and within particular languages - conceals and disavows the specificity 
of each body, and so begets an oppressive sameness".92 Klossowski observes Nietzsche's 
various illnesses and sees the body at war with itself. Klossowski writes, "If the body is 
presently in pain, if the brain is sending nothing but distress signals, it is because a 
language is trying to make itself heard at the price ofreason".93 The project for 
Klossowski became one that would seek to de-subjectivize the false construct that was 
the self/ego, by actively releasing the impulses of the body through a multiplicity of 
vociferous/discursive modes. This multiplicity within the body is what Klossowski refers 
to as "solecism". "Solecism refers to the body working in two directions that oppose each 
other".94 In order for this ethical project of releasing the body to become disseminated 
Klossowski's fiction will aim to affect the reader on a corporeal level, where the reader 
feels the words that Klossowski writes. The reader will chose the visceral body over their 
misguided economy of language, now aware that the latter was purely reactive and 
oppressive (economic language). 
Artaud 
With regard to any philosophy of subjectivity constituted upon affirmation, 
Antonin Artaud occupies a special place. His descent (if it can be called a 'descent') into 
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insanity was chronicled through the horrific images that he produced of the human body 
during his stay at Rodez. 
Artaud's drawings ... articulated the utter fragmentation of identity which he had endured through 
his incarceration and electroshocks. The surface ofthe drawings became an arena in which Artaud 
dispersed an imagery of decapitated body parts and organs, screaming mouths and jagged scars. 
These elements of a physical detritus were set against a threatening proliferation of electrical 
instruments and machine parts, of nails and spikes.95 
These drawings were not negative rejections of life (given all the pain that Artaud had 
been forced to endure) they were in fact affirmations of the life inside him that had not 
been destroyed. Instead of dwelling negatively on what he was not Artaud chose to 
explore the remaining drives and forces of life within. As Stephen Barber writes, "Artaud 
had been digging into his body to discover what was left alive. In a drawing such as Box 
Up The Anatomy, only the discarded bones are left of the body - but even this autopsied 
debris can be seen to contain the traces of new human figures within it".96 Although 
graphic and obscene, Artaud's drawings, along with literary transgressions such as 
Klossowski's Roberte ce soir and the rape scene of Roberte by the Colossus and 
Hunchback, serve to strike a cord, or ignite a visceral reaction within the viewer/reader 
and awaken an awareness concerning the multiplicity of selves within our bodies that are 
oppressed and waiting to become affirmed. 
Part 5: Wandering depressives 
Kristeva's later thought 
Recalling the introductory parts pertaining to Kristeva's notion of negativity I will 
consider the "early Kristeva" to be sufficiently covered. In this section I will restrict my 
discussion only to Kristeva's "later thought." Kristeva's later thought would be primarily 
articulated in three works during the 1980's: Powers of Horror (1980), Tales of Love 
(1987), and Black Sun (1989).97 While never abandoning the notion of "process" 
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developed in her early work, Kristeva's focus will shift slightly during this period toward 
stressing the importance of the pre-verbal moment prior to subject formation that is 
constitutive of subjectivity. For Kristeva, and alongside Beardsworth I take this 
constitutive moment to be the loss ofthe mother, or what the mother was to the infant 
prior to subject formation. 
The reason that the separation from the mother is of such significance for Kristeva 
is because its marks the break with our primary narcissism. She writes, "The Freudian 
Narcissus does not know who he is at all and only invests in his image because he is not 
sure of his own identity [ ... ] Why is this organization unstable, on the border? Because it 
is still too dependent on the other - in this case, the Mother - from whom the subject is in 
the process of separating". 98 Indeed for Kristeva, after our immediate separation from 
dependency upon the mother we are rendered without a definite identity. This is not to 
suggest that prior to separation from the mother the subject did have a proper identity and 
that it was this identity that is lost. What I mean to convey after reading Kristeva is more 
in-line with Heidegger's notion of "throwness" such that we are thrown into the world 
without any discernible nature or guidelines by which to live. 99 
There is, for Kristeva, a condition of lack that results from the separation from the 
mother. This lack is constitutive; meaning that it can never be "filled" per se. This lack of 
an identity is constituted as such due to the fact that during the separation the infant 
literally lost that which he/she identified as itself - the mother. 100 This is what establishes 
the subject, for Kristvea, as a subject-in-process; a subject forever "on-trial" trying to 
establish an identity for itself. However the identity that this subject-in-process desires is 
one that is always already lost to it. Recall that the first "experiences" of the yet-to-be-
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subject (in/ans) were purely affective and not symbolic. As such the world as we 
experience it symbolically is strange to us. 101 It is strange to us insofar as these things that 
we see around us offer us no meaning, but instead only offer us opportunity to represent 
affective, pre-symbolic, experiences through which we can identify ourselves. One can 
never return to that stage of primary narcissism (with the mother). The closest we can 
come to identifYing with this unattainable identity is through experiences 0/ loss, 
separation, breaks, ruptures, and so on. These events are what Kristeva sees as repetitive 
within and constitutive oflife throughout. There are, as have been mentioned earlier, 
three moments ofpre-subjectivellinguistic/oedipal development which Kristeva adds to 
the psychoanalytic and philosophical corpus: love, loss, and abjection. I want now to 
focus on expanding these concepts as they will set the foundation for my critique of the 
limitations of Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of subjectivity. 
Love 
Kristeva asserts in Tales o/Love, "all the philosophies of thought, from Plato 
down to Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, that have aimed to give the experience of love a 
strong hold on reality have pruned out of it what is disorderly in order to reduce it to an 
initiatory voyage drawn toward the supreme Good or the absolute Spirit".102 What 
Kristeva means to articulate here is that for the most part philosophers have sought to 
situate love within an organized totality or system of thought that can be given 
"symbolic" meaning. Love in this sense becomes reified. By "reification" I understand 
the process of taking something abstract and rendering it material or concrete. 
Philosophers have been driven to understand the nature of love by demarcating what love 
is. They have sought to provide it with a recognizable identity. However, the desire to 
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characterize 'love' as 'x', 'y', or 'z' threatens to lead one down a reductive path; hence 
love becomes reified. 
Contemporary science has revealed certain paradoxes that are central to our 
conception of the universe. Things do not necessarily abide by Aristotle's law of the 
excluded middle; for example light is both a wave and a particle. Likewise love is 
something that cannot be delimited neatly and placed within a static symbolic system as 
Kristeva asserts has been the case throughout western history in Tales of Love. Love is a 
very nebulous, muddy concept that virtually resists clear and definite articulation or 
identification. Conventionally love's antithesis has been considered -- hate. But as Freud 
illustrates in his observations of child's play, love and hate are veritably intermingled 
with one another (see "fort-da"). 
Turning his observation to clinical psycho-pathology Freud focused on the 
"disorder" behind the speech of the patient's actions. Psychoanalysis - the talking cure-
would utilize the mishaps, slips of the tongue, jokes, and so on to postulate the existence 
of a plethora of repressed desires alive in the unconscious of the patient. Therefore that 
which philosophers attempted to totalize within a symbolic system of discourse was 
arguably the furthest thing from love. Freud's experience of watching his grandson play 
with the reel/sting illustrates the point that love resists concrete identification. 
These "games" can, however, evolve into greater problems for the subject in 
question, namely growing and morphing into debilitating neurosis. Without seeking an all 
encompassing panacea, Freud contended that by talking through the absurdities and 
fantasies enunciated through the speech of the patient, the repressed "reality" of their 
desires could be made evident for them. Upon understanding (if only a fraction of ... ) this 
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repressed reality, the patient could, through the mentorship of the analyst, construct 
hislher own conscious reality of, as Kristeva phrases it, "a more or less fragile border of 
your love life". 103 This mentorship or relationship between analyst and analysand is the 
"transference relationship." It is the structure through which love can be used as a cure. 
Kristeva describes the structure of the transference relationship as, "two bodies listening 
and speaking to each other sight unseen". 104 The analysand is positioned facing away 
from the analyst. This is because in the exchange of speaking and listening the analysand 
becomes unable to think of any other object ofhislher love than the one that presents 
itself then and there: the other, simply there, listening and present. The analysand does 
not want to know that the other "is only a doctor and furthermore that he is not 'free",.105 
This love is developed to a point where it becomes unbearable and the analysand 
confesses their love for the analyst. The analyst then informs that, "No, it is not (only) me 
that you love, itis also, it is above all ... so and_so".106 
This person, this "so and-so" that the analysand really loves is what Kristeva 
refers to the lost "Thing" of primary narcissim, or of whom the analyst "offers himself 
[to] cathexis like an archaic mother under a hold as loving as it is deadly". 107 Before 
continuing further, some clarification: 
(1) This relationship is caring. The "so and-so" which Kristeva calls the lost 
Thing is also referred to as the archaic mother because the "archaic mother" stands for 
the object-of-choice of the infans during the pre-verbal stage of development when the 
mother could not be identified as such. In other words, the lost Thing can also be 
considered on par with the chora in Kristeva's corpus, insofar as both the lost Thing and 
the chora resist being "named" as such. Therefore during transference the analyst 
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functions as the archaic mother of pre-verbal development, prior to when the subject 
could be considered a subject proper. In the process of analysis the analyst helps the 
analysand form a coherent narrative that they can choose to adopt and practice as the 
foundation for their own life projects. It is in this sense that the transference relationship 
IS carmg. 
(2) This relationship is deadly. Transference hearkens to a time in development 
where the child did not experience subjectivity as such since it was narcissistically fused 
with the mother in the mother/child dyad. The analyst also serves the function of the 
father. This is the function of the analyst that allows for the analysand to separate from 
the analyst after treatment. This is only made possible assuming the analyst falls in love 
with the patient. "For if I do not really love my patients, what could I understand in them, 
what could I tell them"I08; that is to say, what could the analyst tell the analysand 
regarding what they are capable of representing to themselves as their reality such that it 
will remain productive for them. This is "Countertransference." Tranference / 
countertranseference is deadly insofar as the analyst could seriously damage the 
analysand's capacity to break away as their own subject, if he/she becomes too carried 
away with their own power and desires of narcissistic fortification. 
Although there are physically only two people present in analysis, or transference 
love, there are three people involved in the dynamic: "the subject (the analysand), his 
imaginary or real object of love ... and the Third Party, the stand-in for potential Ideal, 
possible Power".I09 Both of the latter are "played" by the analyst, respectively. This is the 
role of the father -- as mentioned above - which functions as a site for symbolic 
generation (recall Lacan's Name-of-the-Father). "The analyst occupies that place of the 
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Other; he is a subject who is supposed to know ... and as a consequence he will, in the 
cure, become the supreme loved one and first-class victim" .110 This is why the 
transference relationship (transference love) resists reification. Both Freud and Kristeva 
recognize that in the 'love' relationship, predicated as it is on a primordial relationship 
between Two, the love object is simultaneously loved and hated. For example, sex, as an 
act that is thought to be symbolic of the love shared between two (or more) individuals, is 
ironically something incredibly violent. Therefore sex is a certain manifestation of 
hate. lll 
Take another example: Elisabeth Bronfen's comments in Over her dead body: "At 
the same time symbolization, as one of the main ways of establishing a relation to the 
outside world and to reality, is grounded on violence, initially on the sadistic relation to 
the maternal body.,,1l2 This is what it means for the analyst to be the one who is suppose 
to know how to love. While serving the role of the one which is the object of the 
analysand's love-cathexis (mother), the analyst also serves as the Third Party (father) 
who presents the subject-to-be with a symbolic discourse. By encouraging the analysand 
to simply speak in the mode of stream-of-consciousness (spewing forth the unconscious 
ramblings of condensation and displacement, free association, and so on) the patient is 
able to produce "a literature lacking an audience" but a literature which nonetheless 
grants the "cathartic effects of great art". 113 It is in this sense that Kristeva places the 
emphasis she does on art, literature (poetry especially) and psychoanalysis, and not 
philosophy proper, as a means of ethical self-transformation. 
Loss 
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Kristeva's work Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia continues her critique of 
Freud's account of the structures of primary narcissism. Her examination begins by 
fleshing out the theory that suggests affective "experiences" are maintain and/or 
transferred within the material of the body. "Deficiencies in the left hemisphere, which 
controls linguistic generation, lead to domination - temporary as it may be - by the right 
hemisphere, which controls affects" .114 The affects that are registered by the body are 
those "experiences" of the "booming and buzzing" of our pre-subjective narcissistic 
relationship with the mother. "I shall posit that the register of psychic and,particularly 
linguistic representation is neurologically transferred to the physiological occurrences of 
the brain".115 The affects that were "pre-subjectively" experienced leave a trace upon our 
brains which is represented as a trace of something of which we can only understand as 
lost to us. Throughout history man's attempt to represent this lost 'entity' has taken many 
forms. Whether it be represented as God or a transcendent signified, Kristeva suggest that 
it is our primary narcissism that allows for us to explore the world both inside and outside 
of ourselves through the playful work of art and literature; attempting to capture the lost 
"Thing" through our use of symbols. 
However this process of continuously attempting to represent the lost Thing 
manifests itself in frustration (recall Lacan) and more radically in depression and 
melancholia for Kristeva. This is due to the fact that there is an "excess of affect" that 
"has thus no other means of coming to the fore than to produce new languages". 116 We 
constantly experience ourselves as moving from one symbolic system to another with the 
impending realization that these symbolic systems or paradigms are arbitrary and thus 
inherently meaningless. "With melancholy persons", Kristeva suggests, "meaning 
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appears arbitrary [ ... ] Meaning, however, is arbitrary". 117 She uses the example of the 
word "LAF" and the fact that the letters LAF are completely unmotivated with respect to 
the meaning of "Laugh". The meaning is what is important and when the power of the 
signifier to represent the meaning fails, it is time for the subject to establish another 
language or symbolic system that meets this need. 
Signs that compose symbolic systems are arbitrary and their "origin" derives from 
the moment the infant loses the mother in primary narcissism. The infant comes to 
lament the loss of the pre-objectal mother through an immediate "denial" of such loss. 
Literally, Kristeva says, the infant responds, "I have lost an essential object that happens 
to be, in the final analysis, my mother," ... "But no, I have found her again in signs, or 
rather since I consent to lose her I have not lost her ... I can rediscover her in language". 118 
This is what Kristeva calls the "negation of loss" (along with the depression occasioned 
by mourning). There is a constitutive depression that is brought along with the 
inauguration of symbolic language; because, as the lost object is mourned, Kristeva adds, 
the mourning that laments the loss is incomplete. Depressed persons "disavow negation" 
she writes. They nostalgically fall back on/into the real object (The Thing) of loss that 
they do not manage to lose. As such these individuals remain painfully "riveted" to the 
Thing. 119 The significance of what Kristeva is arguing for is that this depression is what 
characterizes all language as well as art; indeed the human condition. We are all 
depressives in search of love. This connects her notion of depression and melancholia 
with love in the previous section. 
The act of denying negation is the act of an impossible mourning, and it is this 
impossible mourning that establishes an artificial/unbelievable language that is not 
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accessible to any signifier. 120 This is what is meant by the notion of "traces" being left 
upon our subjectivity from the pre-subjective narcissistic state of development. "The 
result is that traumatic memories ... are not repressed but constantly evoked as the denial 
of negation prevents the work of repression, at least of its representative part" .121 This is 
Kristeva fleshing out the claim that the dividing line that separates our ego from its 
origins (primary narcissism) is indeed more blurred than originally thought. The way that 
we understand ourselves as symbolic beings, organized and socialized through rituals as 
well as custom and habit is arbitrary. When we realize this we become seduced by the 
traces of our pre-subjective being. To fall victim to this seduction would guarantee our 
death and is typically manifested in the act of suicide. In this sense a depressive's self-
incurred demise is "taboo," or in other psychoanalytic terms: "incestuous". 
The only objects for the depressed person are the "affects".122 The affects, our 
moods and emotions, become our "love-objects" in a sense, or as Kristeva words it, 
staying true to the Kleinian tradition, the ''partial object of depressed persons" .123 The 
depressive person, (who is "everyone" for Kristeva) becomes perverse with respect to 
their "love objects," developing a sycophantic relationship to their affects. The end to 
which the depressive strives is a "narcissistic homeostasis". They feel "a nonverbal, 
unnamable (omnipotent) hold over a nonobjectal Thing.,,124 However this leads to 
borderline personality conditions, flirtations with suicide, and so on. This is why Kristeva 
sees psychoanalysis as pragmatic in the sense that it can be used to dissolve the "denial 
mechanism" that leads to melancholia. Through analysis, Kristeva suggests, a "genuine 
graft" of the symbolic can be offered up to the subject through the use of "discursive 
strategies" (hence the notion of the 'talking cure' and the efficacy of 'transference' as 
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championed in the previous sub-section). By working at the intersection of the 
affectivellinguistic or symbolic/semiotic,125 as Kristeva is apt to phrase it, the analysand 
(subject) will best be able to form a meaningful narrative for herself that will effectively 
salvage her from the squalor of depression from which she will never truly be free. It is in 
this sense that psychoanalysis is a counterdepressant (Contra: Antidepressant) for 
Kristeva. 
Abjection 
Indeed psychoanalysis can be utilized as a counterdepressant, effectively saving 
the subj ect from the squalor of depression, or that limit of her ego where her sense of self 
threatens to decompose completely. This borderline state that threatens the stability of the 
ego and thus defines the greater part of Kristeva's subject-in-process, is called abjection. 
The most definite thing that can be said of abjection (if anything definite can be 
said at all about it) is that "abjection is above all ambiguity,,126: internal/external, 
lovedlhated, true/false, and/or logical/illogical. However in its psychoanalytic function, 
"abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objecta I relationship, in the 
immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order 
to be - maintaining that night in which the outline of the signified thing vanishes and 
where only the imponderable affect is carried out". 127 We are drawn toward moments and 
sites of the abject everywhere we tum. 128 They are psychically necessary, for they allow 
the subject to say "that is what I am not!" A corpse for instance is a moment of abjection. 
The corpse provides a definite representation of what it is to be a "living" body. 
However, throughout western history man has toyed with the idea of a definite boundary 
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with respect to death and the corpse. Take for example the cultural fascination the west 
displays with respect to zombies, witches, and of course vampires. 
Adam Phillips makes the bold assertion that "being a person is virtually or 
potentially intolerable unless you are lucky enough to live in a time of war" .129 This claim 
is less offensive when one considers it in light of what he mentions just prior, that "what 
war confirmed, and the air raids in particular, was' ... how very much easier it is for the 
human mind to tolerate external danger than internal dangers"'. 130 Phillips, drawing our 
attention to the events of the Second World War (air raids in London), argues that there is 
a constitutive aspect to the human condition such that we find it easier to psychically 
manage external war than manage the war we are constantly fighting within ourselves 
(the content of our repression). Kristeva, in Powers of Horror, devotes great attention to 
the writings of Celine; a writer who in the wake of the Second World War had this to say 
about the condition of the subject: "Suffering as the place of the subject. Where it 
emerges, where it is differentiated from chaos. An incandescent, unbearable limit 
between inside and outside, ego and other. The initial, fleeting grasps: "suffering," "fear," 
ultimate words sighting the crest where sense topples over into senses, the "intimate" into 
"nerves." Being as ill-being".l31 There is a sense in which war is inevitable and/or even 
willed by the human subject. This is because war serves the function of the abject, or the 
preconditions for the foundations of the ego. Since, as Kristeva posits, the mourning 
which laments our separation from the pre-objectal mother is always already incomplete, 
we are in constant need of these abject conditions to assert our independent sense of self. 
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The most radical realization of this hypothesis is found in the work of Klaus 
Theweleit. In the 'foreword' to Male Fantasies: Women, Floods, Bodies, History Barbara 
Ehrenreich articulates Theweleit's disturbing thesis about the Freikorp, 
The Freikorps-men hate women, specifically women's bodies and sexuality. It would not be going 
too far to say that their perpetual war was undertaken to escape women; even the motherly 
battlefront nurse is a threatening intrusion in the unisexual world of war. This hatred - or dread -
of women cannot be explained with Freud's all-purpose Oedipal triangulation ... The dread arises 
in the pre-Oedipal struggle of the fledgling self, before there is even an ego to sort out the objects 
of desire and the odds of getting them: It is a dread, ultimately, of dissolution - of being 
swallowed, engulfed, annihilated. Women's bodies are the holes, swamps, pits of muck that can 
engulf 132 
If the matricidal condition of war is set in motion by the pre-Oedipal stage of 
development than the need for war-like conditions, abject conditions, pervade beyond 
that of the select group of men in Germany who would later go on to form what would 
come to be known as the Nazi party. It is constitutive of the human condition. "The abject 
confronts us ... with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even 
before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the autonomy oflanguage. It is a violent, clumsy 
breaking away, with the risk of falling back under the sway of a power as securing as it is 
stifling".133 It is the enacting of the Freudian 'death drive'; that is to say, the desire we 
have to return to that prior state inorganic being, characteristic of our narcissism. Kristeva 
writes, "The abject ... takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from 
which, in order to be, the ego has broken away - it assigns it a source in the non-ego, 
drive, and death. Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). It is 
an alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of life, of new signifiance" .134 
Celine's rendition of the suffering and trauma of the abject conditions of war are 
not meaningless, but instead serve a very important psychic function, for it is what 
connects the phenomenon of the abject to love. "A narrative is, all in all, the most 
elaborate attempt, next to syntactic competence, to situate a speaking being between his 
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desires and their prohibitions, in short, the Oedipal triangle". 135 The act of superimposing 
a narrative atop utter chaos is an act of love. Even if this narrative is to depict chaos as 
"chaos", it remains a representation of chaos nonetheless. Consider Kristeva's argument 
that suggests that the subject's utilization of the signifier in free-fancy allows for the 
depiction of non-representable non-sense to be made manifest (albeit symbolically) to the 
subject. However, it is this very content, the non-representable non-sense (or the 
"booming and buzzing" of pre-symbolic narcissism) which is desired by the subject. 
Composing a narrative allows for the subject to "flirt" with that which is forbidden to 
him, (the "incest taboo") the pre-objectal relationship to the mother. He seeks to 
accomplish this by violating the phallic mark of the signifier, the symbolic, or the Name-
of-the-Father. By using the signifier in ways that transgress its primacy of meaning and 
representation the subject can gain a tenuous glimpse of their repressed desires. Our 
desire to experience love with the lost object is made possible through narrative. 
Kristeva extends her thesis on the abject to disquiet the boundaries within her own 
Freudian understanding of the psyche. She writes, 
On such limits and at the limit one could say that there is no unconscious, which is elaborated 
when representations and affects (whether or not tied to representations) shape a logic. Here on the 
contrary, consciousness has not assumed its rights and transformed into signifiers those fluid 
demarcations of yet unstable territories where an "I" that is taking shape is ceaselessly straying. 136 
Kristeva erases the Cartesian dualism inherent within the psychoanalytic corpus to which 
she subscribes. The conscious/unconscious divide is an artificial construct. She sees this 
thesis fleshed out in works of literature (a la Celine) as well as works of visual art 
(painting in particular). Kristeva sees art as giving symbolic status to that which is 
usually considered "disturbing or un-representable, inexpressible, unsigned,,137 or in other 
Ellis 51 
words, the unconscious. Where the unconscious and consciousness begin and end is 
wholly ambiguous. 138 
These are the three moments of pre-Oedipal development which for Kristeva have 
lasting implications for the status of the subject as one that is always already in-process, 
on-trial, and/or under analysis. It is now that I will turn my attention toward fleshing out 
the opposing camp, that of the anti-Oedipals: Deleuze and Guattari. 
Part 6: Schizophrenics 
In order to place this section in context I want to first state that Kristeva 
recognizes Hegelian negativity to be essentially tethered to the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious. In Strangers to Ourselves she writes that Romanticism as well as German 
nationalism (Herder's Volksgeist), "but especially the Hegelian Negativity - which at the 
same time restored and systematized, unleashed and bound the power of the Other, 
against and within the consciousness of the Same - might be thought of as stages on the 
way to the "Copernican revolution" that the discovery of the Freudian unconscious 
amounted to". 139 Deleuze makes explicit his position on the matter when he exclaimed, 
"what I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the dialectic".140 
Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the subject-ol-enunciation 
The subject, for Deleuze and Guattari is structured linguistically, albeit in a 
radically different way compared to Kristeva. Quite generally, Deleuze and Guattari do 
not see language as being tainted with abjection or loss, and as such they do not see 
literature or poetry as acts of mourning. They choose to take up Lacan's theory of 
subjectivity as constituted through language; however, they will rescind the castration 
complex associated with the signifier. There is no desire to which the signifier or the 
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Narne-of-the-Father is prohibiting access with respect to the subject. In short, subjectivity 
does not originate from lack. They write in Anti-Oedipus, "Desire does not lack anything; 
it does not lack its object. It is rather, that subject that is missing in desire". 141 In light of 
the above remarks on Hegel's interpretation of language, Deleuze and Guattari would 
criticize Hegel for trying to get at the "particular" by means of the universal. All that are 
present are signifiers that simply float about a general assemblage of other signifiers. This 
interpretation of the linguistic construction of subjectivity is much deeper and complex 
than this and requires further clarification. 
Deleuze and Guattari's schizoid theory of subjectivity, insofar as their subject is a 
"speaking subject", operates according to the nature of what they call "order-words." 
"The elementary unit oflanguage - the statement is the order-word.,,142 I will elaborate 
upon order-words later, for now let it be considered sufficient to state that for Deleuze 
and Guattari language is first and foremost tied to power. This notion of power is meant 
to be understood in the sense that Foucault uses the term. It pertains to the ability of 
institutions and/or individuals to coerce others into acting in certain ways that said others 
would not otherwise have acted. I do not mean to suggest that there is a corporeal 
coercion or force persuading individuals to act in ways they would not otherwise choose. 
Power for Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari is all pervasive. It penetrates to the 
very core of the subject's constitution qua subject. 
For Deleuze and Guattari there are three aspects to their philosophy of language, 
which when understood in concert significantly implicate how they understand the 
emergence of subjectivity. The three aspects of language are: (1) That the function of all 
language is the transmission of order-words; (2) The relationship order-words have with 
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what are known as "Assemblages of Enunciation"; (3) The mechanism by means of 
which these assemblages affect change through "Incorporeal Transformations." I will 
now explain these in sequential order, explaining all technical terminology in the process. 
Order-words are commands and instructions. However these commands and 
instructions are not solely directed toward an Other, such as from a teacher to student. 
Order-words are self-affective in nature. Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a 
school mistress challenging her students on an answer. A cursory inspection may suggest 
that the mistress is enforcing the proper code of knowledge into the minds of her 
students. However such is not exclusively the matter. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the 
mistress is also, and more importantly, keeping herself in check. She is enforcing her own 
code. "Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel 
obedience".143 By challenging the students she is essentially challenging herself as well, 
reinforcing the structures of power that are dominating the situation at present. 
The power that these order-words distribute in their use is not the product of any 
idiosyncratic experience or meaning therein. There is nothing personal that the statement 
is specifically endowed with. The order-word is nothing other than a tacitly accepted 
utterance generated by means of a collective. This is the "assemblage of enunciation". As 
with other poststructuralist theorists, Deleuze and Guattari deflect from any notion of a 
unified subj ect. Instead they choose to fragment, or de-center the subj ect amongst the 
collectivity through which it lives. This is how Deleuze and Guattari can get away with 
their claim that there is no "subject" of Enunciation, or no "speaking subject" proper a la 
Kristeva. The subject is only a subject insofar as it acts as a conduit through which the 
utterances of the collective can spread and dominate. To be more precise, what this 
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means is that throughout time transient collectivities, or assemblages, will coalesce to 
form groups that resonate together and thus enunciate together. These enunciations are 
sets of codes and conducts, rules and regulations agreed upon using a multiplicity of 
glosses. 144 No one in particular enunciates these rules or laws with one tongue, only the 
assemblage speaks. Thus when the individual speaks it is not their own words that they 
utter; they are the words that float throughout the assemblage. This is what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean when they say "Language is not life; it gives life orders.,,145 
That the words individuals utter are not their own but are instead the words of the 
collective implies that speech (and the language from which it is derived) is impersonal. 
This is in diametrical opposition to the position advanced earlier by Kristeva. In fact 
Deleuze and Guattari state explicitly that "language in its entirety is indirect 
discourse".146 By "indirect discourse" they mean that language does not communicate 
first person experience or something novel, but instead reports. According to the latter we 
are all essentially delusional reporters under the impression that we are covering 
"breaking news." Indirect discourse is hearsay insofar as it is "the presence of a reported 
statement within the reporting statement". 147 The reason why language spoken one-on-
one is still impersonal - hearsay - is because "my direct discourse is still the free indirect 
discourse running through me, coming from other worlds or other planets". 148 The point 
that I wish to make here about Deleuze and Guattari' s understanding of language might 
be made clearer in light of an elliptical reference to Kristeva's amendments to what she 
perceived as the short-comings of contemporary linguistics. 149 
The mechanism by means of which "assemblages of enunciation" affect change in 
the social stratum via order-words is explained by the phenomenon of "incorporeal 
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transformations." Deleuze and Guattari claim that, "words are not tools, but we give 
children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes".lso For 
these artifacts of language to have any power they must be situated within a proper milieu 
(i.e. shovels and pickaxes are powerful devices on a construction site or in the garden; not 
a kitchen). Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a judge's proclamation of a man as 
"guilty!" The act of the judge's ruling changes the man from being a mere "man" into a 
"guilty man". By uttering the word "Guilty!" the judge affects a change upon the man 
that was not present seconds prior. Nothing has changed in the man but there is a 
difference to his character - the way he carries himself. He is now a "guilty man". This is 
how language ("order-words") implicates subjectivity through society. 
Deleuze and Guattari do not agree with Kristeva that it is necessary to posit the 
importance of the pre-oedipal or pre-verbal stages of development to account for the 
"semiotic" in poetic and literary texts. They argue that intonations, rhythms, tones, 
stammering, musicality, pitch, are not constitutive of symbols, but are indeed "bodies" 
like any other bodies. Deleuze' s book on Spinoza illustrates this point clearly, "When a 
body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations 
sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the 
other". 151 The elements oflinguistics, oflanguage (semiotic or symbolic in Kristeva's 
case) are all bodies that modify each other. Order-words, likewise, are bodies. For 
Deleuze and Guattari "bodies" come into contact with other "bodies" in the production of 
power. Stated in other words, when "semiotic" bodies collided/mix with "symbolic" 
order-word bodies the effect is an incorporeal transformation in the power of the 
statement. For example, Deleuze and Guattari note that, "in the course of a single day, an 
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individual repeatedly passes from language to language. He successfully speaks as 
"father to son" and as a boss; to his lover, he speaks an infantilized language; while 
sleeping he is plunged into an oniric discourse, then abruptly returns to a professional 
language when the telephone rings". 152 In the above example the manner by means of 
which the man speaks to his lover need not be considered "baby talk" (or infantile, in a 
regressive mode) because of some repressed incestuous desire to be one with the pre-
objectal mother. It is simply a way to make his words mean one thing rather than another. 
The purposes intended -- to meld as one with his "present" love interest (not a 
replacement mother) - is achieved through the merely heuristic means of language. 
The philosophy of language that Deleuze and Guattari propose is directly tied to 
their project of self-transformation, or simply the "productive" construction of 
subjectivity. They encourage using the artifacts of one's own language (even 
incorporating elements from other languages) to open one's "body to connections that 
presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages 
and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the 
craft of a surveyor". 153 This is fundamentally different when compared to the 
psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity that Freud or Kristeva advance, centering 
their focus on a loss that taints the subject with a feeling characterized by the death drive 
- that tacit sense of wanting to annihilate oneself. There is nothing in Deleuze and 
Guattari's understanding of subjectivity that insists it take a detour through negation 
before it is capable of erecting the future. 
Consider Kafka, a writer that many critics have labeled pessimistic, desolate, 
dejected at the bleak human condition - the dignity of which has forever been lost. 
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Deleuze and Guattari answer these criticisms by producing a "productive" reading of 
Kafka's oeuvre. They write that, "His inaptitude for marriage, his writing, the attraction 
to an intense and barren world are completely positive motivations from a libidinal point 
of view; they aren't reactions in a derivative relation to the father" .154 Kafka's writing is 
not to be considered a negative product of the loss of the mother or any other 
oedipalization. Kafka utilized those things which were present to him in his situation to 
produce what Deleuze and Guattari call a "line of flight", or in other words a means by 
which to escape. This line of flight for Deleuze and Guattari is a purely positive and 
productive means of escape and not a concept that could be derived from a subject 
constituted through a lack. Kafka, if anything according to Deleuze and Guattari, was 
able to evade depression by writing some of the most controversial/revolutionary 
literature of his time. 
Deleuze and Guattari consider these literatures, "minor" literatures. "Since the 
language is arid, make it vibrate with a new intensity". 155 There is no one minor language 
but a multiplicity of languages. Deleuze and Guattari cite New York City as a city that 
has no real language but a multiplicity of minor languages (e.g. black ghetto slangs, 
Hispanic/Jew mongrel type speech, Irish immigrants, etc). "A minor literature doesn't 
come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a maj or 
language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language 
is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization". 156 A line-of-flight is created (a 
utilization and manipulation of the major language (i.e. English) such that a mode of 
speaking opens up that evades the codification (semantics and logic) of the majoritarian 
regime. 
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Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of language and subjectivity essentially has 
to do, as Freud and Kristeva's does, with the production of the unconscious. The 
unconscious is a theme that both camps utilize albeit in radically different ways. Whereas 
for Freud and Kristeva the unconscious is "a continent hidden from the psyche,,,157 
Deleuze and Guattari perceive the unconscious as being produced in plain vision by the 
subject in question. Guattari writes that, 
Gilles Deleuze and I have ... refused the Conscious-Unconscious dualisms of Freudian 
issues ... that follow on the level of oedipal triangulation, castration complex, etc. We opted for an 
unconscious of superimposed, mUltiple strata of subjectivations, heterogenous strata of 
development '" An unconscious, thus, that is more, "schizo", liberated from familialist yokes, and 
turned more toward the current praxis than toward fixations and regressions on the past. 158 
The creation of minor literatures/languages is for Deleuze and Guattari a basis for ethical 
self-transformation or in other words the production of subjectivity. This is one of the 
most important aspects of minor literatures/languages as I understand the matter. I will 
now elaborate on these implications using Deleuze and Guattari' s case study of Kafka. 
In the process of producing a minor literature Kafka was ultimately engaged in a 
process of constructing a multiplicity of subjectivities by means of desubjectivation. 
Deconstructing the subject "Kafka", or what Kafka the man had become, is what Deleuze 
and Guattari consider an ethical practice. Throughout his writings Kafka rej ects the 
traditional construct that he had internalized/maintained as Kafka. Instead he opens 
himself up and exposes himself to the various multiplicities that were present to him, 
from which the traditional understanding of subjectivity had repressed from his 
awareness. "[F]or a while, Kafka thought according to these traditional categories of ... 
the author and the hero, the narrator and the character, the dreamer and the one dreamed 
of. But he will quickly reject the role of the narrator, just as he will refuse an author's or 
master's literature, despite his admiration for Goethe". 159 
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To better understand what multiplicities were present for Kafka to construct his 
subjectivity anew take, for example, some excerpts from some of his shorter stories: "I 
was stiff and cold, 1 was a bridge, 1 layover a ravine.,,160 ... "Consider us dogs, on the 
other hand! ,,161 A dog, a bridge, a beetle in "Metamorphosis". Kafka no longer exists as 
Kafka the man, the subject, but is now poured into an endless series of different 
"becomings". "Furthermore, there is no longer a subject of the enunciation, nor a subject 
of the statement. . .it is no longer the subject of enunciation who is "like" a beetle, the 
subject of the statement remaining a man. Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a 
mutual becoming, in the heart of a necessarily mUltiple or collective assemblage".162 The 
dog, bridge, and beetle form part of a collective. They are "bodies" moving about the 
same plane. They are "bodies" colliding with other bodies with the emergent property of 
constructing the "becoming-dog" of Kafka, the "becoming-beetle" of Kafka, or 
"becoming-bridge" of Kafka. 
Subjectivity for Deleuze and Guattari, in short, is produced in a purely affirmative 
manner; not constituted as in permanent crisis because of a defining moment in pre-
oedipal development. What 1 mean is that for Deleuze and Guattari the subject is defined 
"disjunctively"; that is to say, the subject is recognized as This 'or' This 'or' This 'or' 
This (where "This" represents a given assemblage). 1 am not one subject, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, but a multiplicity of subjectivities. 1 have no limits, no boundaries; 
my possibilities are endless. The subject is never comported toward the world in a 




Deleuze and Guattari are not naIve with respect to the importance that pre-
Oedipal development has with respect to subjectivity, for it is during this time that the 
child is first inaugurated into a world of language. The point that Deleuze and Guattari 
take issue with is the resultant oedipalization that results after the completion of the 'pre-
Oedipal' phase. The criticism that Deleuze and Guattari are leveling against Oedipus is 
that they see it as reductive. It eliminates "difference", present as it is in the form of 
contradictions, opposites, and pure singularities. What this means can be more succinctly 
put by paying closer attention to Deleuze's doctoral thesis Difference and Repetition. 
In these early excursions Deleuze isolates the stifling effects of Cartesian thought 
on the progression of West em thought. Deleuze writes that, "the 'I think' is the most 
general principle of representation - in other words, the source of these elements and of 
the unity of all these faculties: I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember and I perceive -
as though these were the four branches of the Cogito. On precisely these branches, 
difference is crucified".163 The understanding of a single unified ego is what Deleuze and 
Guattari are poised to dismantle. The ego presents itself as an absurdly narrow vantage 
point by means of which to experience my various relations to the world - to difference 
(myself and others included). 
Later in his collaborative writings with Guattari, Deleuze will take aim against the 
position of a unified ego, filtered as it had been through the sieve of Hegelianism as well 
as the emergence of ego psychology prevalent in the wake of Freud. Instead Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that our life is structured as a continuation of the primordial experiences of 
the infans (a pre-subjective subject). "From the very first days of his life, he [the child] 
immediately begins having an amazing nonfamilial experience that psychoanalysis has 
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completely failed to take into account". 164 The immediate experience of the child is 
fragmented not between the mother and father but between "partial-objects". De1euze and 
Guattari state that the child does not experience the breast at which it suckles as the breast 
of its mother, the Mother; it experiences the breast as a "machine." This breast is quite 
literally a milk-producing-machine, a partial-object, which is connected to a milk-
consuming-machine (the child's mouth). These two 'machines' together form what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as an "assemblage". Deleuze and Guattari's so called 
'hatred' of Hegel and the dialectic is situated within this context. For Hegel these 
fragmented partial-objects flow into their opposites via negativity. They are defined by 
what they are not and as such are defined by a type of castration. Here it is important to 
understand that I draw a similarity between Hegel's understanding of negativity (or the 
act/process of negation) and castration. That is to say I understand castration as 
characteristic of what it is to be defined by that which one is not. In the above example 
the opposite of the child would be the whole organism of the parent. Multiplicity and 
difference are reduced. In response to this Deleuze and Guattari take up and develop the 
schizoanalytic approach. 
Schizoanalysis is a practice ofliving that emphasizes desubjectifying, 
destructuration, de constructing, etc., that which has become reduced to the same in order 
to liberate the multiplicity repressed within. What schizoanalysis aims to show is that 
subjectivity may be constituted upon familial encounters of some description (partial-
objects of a Mother and a Father) but that is not all there is to subjectivity as far as 
Deleuze and Guattari are concerned. In Chaosmosis, Guattari asks the question, "should 
we keep the semiotic productions of the mass media, informatics, te1ematics and robotics 
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separate from psychological subjectivity?,,165 He answers in the negative, asserting 
instead that, "technological machines of information and communication operate at the 
heart of human subjectivity, not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its 
sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms".166 Consider children born around the mid 
80's who will never have known a world without AIDS as well as the children born today 
who will never have known a world without cloning, the internet, and text messaging. 
Would these aspects of culture not, ask Deleuze and Guattari, have implications for the 
constitution of subjectivity? They agree that indeed it would. Their project is to flesh out 
what subjectivity might be when these once-ignored "extra-familial" aspects are 
considered significant to the constitution of subjectivity. 
Becoming a Body without Organs 
"Becomings" are a practice ofreconfiguring the parts of my body, endowing them 
with certain speeds and slownesses, movements and rests unlike that of the molar entity 
"man". There are multiplicities of said becomings that provide escape routes from "man" 
(lines-of-flight). Anything that is perceived as living in the shadow of man, is considered 
a veritable possibility for an act of becoming. For example becoming-woman, becoming-
child (resists the "adult" connotation of man), becoming-black (resists the "white" euro-
centric prejudice of man), and becoming-animal (resists the artificial construction of man 
as a "rational" animal). These practices of 'becoming' are radically subjective insofar as 
Guattari claims that, "we are not confronted with a subjectivity given as in-itself, but with 
a process of the realization of autonomy, or of autopoiesis".167 The process of 
subjectification, to stay true to the title of Guttari's book, is quite akin to the properties of 
chaos theory. There is no a priori program, no matter how abstract, that constitutes the 
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subject's status qua subject. Deleuze and Guattari's state that anything can spark a 
becoming of subjectivity. For example, there is something about the "glasses" that throws 
the non-Jew into a veritable becoming-Jew.168 However anything could spark a 
becoming. 
Deleuze and Guattari' s notion of becoming is integral to another important 
concept in their corpus called the Body without Organs (BwO). At the same time that 
Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion of a chora they posit the need for an in-between, a 
zone of ambiguity through which becomings can maneuver. The BwO is according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, something that we are "forever attaining, it is a limit". 169 They 
continue to add that, "On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight-fight and are fought -
seek our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and 
are penetrated; on it we love" .170 The purpose of the BwO is to make or become a joyous 
subject. There are no origins and no destinations for becomings or the BwO. They 
"cannot be conceptualized in terms of past and future. [ ... ] It [becoming] passes between 
the two."l7l This is because "man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory"l72 insofar as 
he connects the dots of events in history to construct a so-called narrative for himself. 
"Any line that goes from one point to another in the aggregate of the molar system ... is a 
part of the arborescent system". 173 Man, or the subj ect that constitutes himself as such by 
connecting the dots is, in the eyes of Deleuze and Guattari, a Becoming-fascist insofar as 
they are excluding "Other" dots, or in other words: excluding 'difference'. 
Becomings and the BwO are Deleuze and Guattari' s attempt at an anti-Hegelian 
(non) dialectic. According to Deleuze and Guattari we should strive to resist this fascism 
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of man (Hegel). This is why lines of becoming are not composed of the points it connects 
but rather "passes between points.,,174 
Klein: anti-oedipalizing the infant 
The most important aspect of the schiozanalytic system of thought is that unlike 
Kristeva's (et. cetera) approach, desire does not stem from a lack or loss. Desire is that 
within which we are always-already situated as subjects. The process through which 
Deleuze and Guattari believe a child experiences its primordial relationships is important 
to fleshing out this claim. Psychoanalysis claims that the subject bases its future 
relationships (loving relations) upon its primordial relationships within the family. 
Although they acknowledge that there may be some truth to this hypothesis, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that it is not the whole picture. I will further elaborate upon this point in 
the following. 
Contemporary psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic approaches to the unconscious 
would not be possible if not for the work ofthe British Object-Relations school, the most 
notable theorist being Melanie Klein. 175 Deleuze and Guattari state that, "Melanie Klein 
was responsible for the marvelous discovery of partial objects, that world of explosions, 
rotations, vibrations. But ... she has nonetheless failed to grasp the logic of these 
objects".176 In short, partial-objects are the objects of the child's world as it experiences 
them: an adumbration of affects, tingles, intensities, etc. These objects are characterized 
by these traits or sensations. Nowhere in these objects does one find a meaning linked to 
a familial integration. This is what I understand Deleuze and Guattari to be suggesting in 
their interpretation of partial-objects: Objects that are constituted as such by virtue of not 
being implicitly predicated on a specific relation to anyone thing. Deleuze and Guattari 
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argue that rather than recognize the multiplicity that these objects are in their own right, 
Klein "oedipalizes" them; that is to say, forces them back into a "dominant reality" that 
has to do with the primordial mother/child and father relationship. 
Klein documents the causal mechanisms, certain effects, expression, and idealist 
conceptions of partial objects which delimit the subject-child's entrance into what she 
calls the "schizoparanoid phase." This schizoid phase, although "destined to play a role in 
totalities aimed at integrating the ego, the object, and drives later in life" also constitute 
the original type of object relation between the ego, the mother, and the father."l77 It is 
this oedipalization that Deleuze and Guattari reject. Instead, for the latter: 
The unconscious is totally unaware of persons as such. Partial objects are not representations of 
parental figures or of the basic patterns offamily relations; they are parts of desiring-machines, 
having to do with a process and with relations of production that are both irreducible and prior to 
anything that may be made to conform to the Oedipal figure. 178 
Before proceeding, notice the term "desiring-machines." This is a technical and important 
term in Deleuze and Guattari. I understand desiring-machines to be entities that 
"produce" desire (jouissance). This is in opposition to Freud's thesis wherein the subject 
is in a constant state of trying to quell the tensions that arise through one's desire. Desire, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, is everywhere. There are no necessary structures to stifle 
(repress) desire. There are only desiring-machines. What I mean by this is that there are 
no necessary familial structures or hierarchical institutions that contain desire in the way 
that the triangulation of Oedipus works to contain desire. Desiring-machines freely 
wander, constantly engaging with new partial-objects and other desiring-machines, 
producing more desire. This is the mechanism of Deleuze and Guattari's adaptation of 
Nietzsche's "affirmation". 
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Deleuze and Guattari give credence to the notion that it is not so much a question 
of "denying the vital importance of parents or the love attachment of children to their 
mothers and fathers" but rather to find out (1) whether everything the child touches is 
experienced as a representative of his parents (recall Freud's "fort-da"), and (2) knowing 
how the child first comes to define the place(s) and function(s) the parents are going to 
occupy as special agents, related to other agents. 179 Deleuze and Guattari answer these 
questions in the following: 
With respect to question (1) Deleuze and Guattari state that ever since the crib the 
mother's breast and nipple, along with the child's feces are simply desiring-machines 
connected to parts of the child's body. ISO They subsequently put forth the argument 
which states that it is impossible to assert that the child lives among these partial objects 
and at the same time claim the child understands these objects to be parts of his parents' 
bodies, or being representative of the parents themselves. Deleuze and Guattari state, "It 
[his mother's breast] exists, rather as a part of a desiring-machine connected to the baby's 
mouth, and is experienced as an object providing a non personal flow of milk, be it 
copious or scanty". 181 Apparently partial-objects and desiring-machines do not represent 
anything such as a lost Thing (as in Klein and Kristvea); although, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, they do serve as a basis for relations or assigning agents places and 
functions. Deleuze and Guattari assert that these agents are not persons anymore than said 
relations are intersubjective. They are merely relations and agents of production and/or 
antiproduction. There is no need, according to Deleuze and Guattari, to retroactively 
assert that a breast is the breast of the mother's and that this object imparted a necessary 
component to what will structure subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari state: "from the very 
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first days of his life, he [the child] immediately begins having an amazing norifamilial 
experience that psychoanalysis has completely failed to take into account". 182 
Question (2) continues upon the notion of 'relations' established through desiring-
machines and partial-objects. Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question: how does an 
Oedipus that is " ... open in all directions to a social field, to a field of production directly 
invested by libido,,183 close up in the infamous triangulation? Deleuze and Guattari's 
answer is that it has to do with the 'relations' that happen to be in place during the child's 
infancy; that is to say, the child's familial contingency. The "pre-oedipal" is characterized 
by a wide-ranging world of desire (nonfamilial relations between partial-objects and 
desiring-machines). Quite literally these sets of relations do not signify "parents" as such. 
The natural state for the child, say Deleuze and Guattari, is defined as "the point of view 
of immediate production.,,184 Oedipal relations are instead ascribed to "the parents" based 
on what Deleuze and Guattari call "the point of view of the recording of the process.,,185 
It is a merely heuristic measure in order to help the child make sense of the dynamics 
within the family, and more importantly for Deleuze and Guattari, they have no long 
lasting implications for what would constitutively define the child's subjectivity. This 
recording is unnecessary insofar as the conditions for ascribing specific relations to "the 
parents" with respect to the child are "contingent." Some more clarification is no doubt 
needed. 
An example would be a child asking itself "What sort of thing is this breathing-
machine on my body without organs?" As I have previously stated, a BwO is the 
experience the child has of her body without a superimposed understanding of it as a 
certain type of body. It is a body assembled out of the affects and intensities, etc., of the 
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world ofpartial-objects and desiring-machines. With respect to the question asked above, 
the only possible answer, Deleuze and Guattari posit, must be sought out in family 
relations, or with that relation "to the woman known as mornrny".186 This answer, just 
like the word 'relate', for Deleuze and Guattari, does not stand for a relationship that is 
produced naturally. On the contrary, it is "produced within the interplay of desiring-
machines.,,187 It is the child's ignorance about the conditionsunder which their answers 
to their questions are generated: taking the relation between this "breathing-machine" and 
my "body without organs" to be a relationship between mommy-and-me; in other words 
the "only relation" that matters. "By boxing the life of the child up within the Oedipal 
complex, by making familial relations the universal mediation of childhood, we cannot 
help but fail to understand the production of the unconscious itself...For the unconscious 
is an orphan, and produces itself within the identity of nature and man". 188 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the people or "objects" whom we love function as 
nodes of "connection, of disjunction, of conj uction" I 89 and flows of desire. It is left to the 
individual as to whether or not he/she chooses to slide into the Oedipal structure of 
subjectivity psychoanalysis tells us to adopt. Deleuze and Guattari argue that this 
prevents the productive flow of desire and its access to a veritable multiplicity of 
connections. As far as their political project is concerned this oedipalization stifles the 
affirmation or "free energy capable of fueling a revolutionary machine". 190 
In the above exegesis I have sought to show how, like Kristeva, the anti-oedipal 
subject is established through the use of language, albeit in a radically different sense. 
Here and there I have alluded to certain issues within these concepts that are troubling 
upon initial inspection. It is now that I will dedicate the remainder of this thesis toward a 
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critical examination of the limitations of De leuze and Guattari's anti-oedipal project with 
specific interest in the notion of the Other. 
Part 7: A consideration of the concept of the Other and its limitation in Deleuze and 
Guattari 
Considering the influence Klein's thought has had upon Kristeva as well as 
Deleuze and Guattari, it seems appropriate that Klein is where I shall begin this last part 
wherein I will illustrate the advantages Kristeva's notion of a connectedness to the Other 
has over that of Deleuze and Guattari. Throughout what follows I will show that the 
Other for Kristeva has a more substantial and motivating force with respect to the subject 
and how that subjectivity is constituted, whereas Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 
Otherness is tenuous and transitory. To illustrate this point I will make specific reference 
to Deleuze's interpretation of the Other qua "simulacra," from Difference and Repetition. 
After this I will dissertate on Kristeva's adaptation of Klein by considering her writing in 
Strangers to Ourselves, wherein the Other is recast as the "foreigner." Finally I will close 
with some considerations on the fact that I see Deleuze to be a thinker who struggles 
deeply with the concept of the Other. There are passages in Difference and Repetition 
that deserve careful analysis as they do suggest a thinker who is intrigued by the language 
that Kristeva fully endorses; however, is not fully convinced. Yet wants to be? 
Klein and the Other 
Recall that in Freud's "primary narcissism" as well as Klein's conception of the 
child's pre-oedipal relationship to its mother, there is no conscious awareness or 
distinction made by the child that posits itself as separate with respect to the mother 
(Other). Quite literally then, it is safe to suggest - on behalf of Freud and Klein - that the 
Other is what contributes to my being albeit at a radically primordial level. Further recall 
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that for Klein, when the breast is suspected of not being present and the infans actively 
rejects the mother (and thus posits itself as independent) this effectively represses the 
primordial relationship with the (m)Other. This phase and its subsequent transition are 
extremely important for Klein, and Kristeva, for the pre-subjective "experiences" that the 
infans underwent during this time carryover into their adult lives. Klein writes: 
for in the first place we gain trust and love in relation to our parents, next we take them ... into 
ourselves; and then we can give from this wealth of loving feelings to the outer world ... [H]atred, 
as we have seen, leads to our establishing frightening figures in our minds, and then we are apt to 
endow other people with unpleasant and malevolent qualities. 191 
This is Klein's purported understanding of the transmission of the unconscious from the 
pre-oedipal into adulthood. Those experiences, which the infans has endured at the hands 
of the (m)Other (or culture at large) and have contributed to the organizing ofhislher 
bodily drives, greatly influence the manner of comportment that the child will have 
throughout hislher life. 
One can see here the "ethical" import Klein places upon the (m)Other during pre-
Oedipal development. I call this role ethical because the implications of a certain kind of 
ordering of the bodily drives will eventually play out in the events of the real world. If the 
pre-oedipal experiences, to which the mother has exposed the child, are skewed toward 
the "painful" end of the spectrum then the "reservoir" of experience the child has to draw 
upon later in life will be rather limited in scope. If, on the other hand, the pre-oedipal 
experiences are pleasurable and 'loving' then the child will be openly ready to engage 
with new and strange objects and so on later in life. What this means is that by being 
exposed to pleasurable and loving experiences during the pre-oedipal stage (and 
following phases) the body of the child becomes primed to feel a certain way in the 
world. It would be equivalent to learning multiple languages early on in life such that 
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one's travels around the world might be more fluid and robust in nature; opposed to 
struggling to understand mere semantic variations between interlocutors. 
Consider the implications of this model. If a child has been "colonized" with good 
and pleasurable pre-Oedipal experiences then they are more likely to project onto the 
world an amicable overtone when strife emerges on the horizon. Klein writes that "if love 
has not been smothered under resentment, grievances and hatred, but has been firmly 
established in the mind, trust in other people and belief in one's own goodness are like a 
rock which withstands the blows of circumstance. ,,192 I find this references to the "blows 
of circumstance" to be helpful for critiquing Deleuze and Guattari' s notion of subj ectivity 
and its relationship to the Other. The relationship the subject has with respect to the Other 
in Deleuze and Guattari is one based mainly on exploitation. The Other is a means by 
which I might be able to increase my body's power (e.g. the "Good" in Spinoza). 
Correlatively the Other may prove "Bad," in the Spinozistic sense of the term, with 
respect to my body and in fact decrease my power. The implications that Klein's theory 
grants the subject is an aspect of "tenacity," or in other words a motivation for sticking 
with the person with whom one might be with (e.g. a sexual/life partner). If every time 
we experienced a bad or painful encounter with the one we love, we would never be with 
anyone at all. We would all end up as isolated narcissi afraid to engage with an Other for 
fear they may hurt us. However insofar as Klein posits the pre-objectal mother as that 
entity which prepares the child for becoming engaged in the world, she is able to work 
around this potential problematic of the subject being a self-contained narcissus. 
Klein takes Freud's use of the "pleasure principle" and adapts it to fit her new 
model of the psyche. She argues that in wake of the pleasure principle, the child (or adult 
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in later years) will expunge into the external world (reject from itself) those experiences 
that are painful. This is the mechanism by which the external/internal dichotomy is 
established in Freud. Klein writes: "we so much dread the hatred in ourselves that we are 
driven to employ one of our strongest measures of defense by putting it on to other 
people - to project it.,,193 Constitutive to the pre-Oedipal psyche of the child is the 'bad 
breast:' the breast which threatens to poison the infant or simply fail to be there promptly 
enough to satisfy the infants needs. This is what is being projected onto objects of the 
external world - not the bad breast per se - representations of the bad breast, or mental 
substitutions thereof. Klein is aware that a certain trace of unpleasant or outright painful 
experience is inevitable in development and thus it is part of what constitutes us as 
subjects that we expunge these painful experiences. However because these painful 
experiences are mixed with feelings of pleasure (characteristic of a distinctionless state of 
being) there is an uncanny sense of guilt that one perceives in the presence of these "bad" 
Others. 
This guilt is felt because the infant feels guilty that the very thing that s/he has 
rejected is indeed the very thing that it needs in order to survive, or that which it loves. 
This internal feeling of guilt is hated by the infant because the feeling of having done 
something damaging to the thing that one loves and needs is unsettling. However this 
feeling of guilt and indebtedness is beneficial for the subject insofar as it provides the 
"motivation" seeking out and establishing "good" contacts that effectively quell these 
painful feelings. Klein: "[M]aking reparation - which is such an essential part of the 
ability to love - widens the scope, and the child's capacity to accept love and, by various 
means, to take into himself goodness from the outer world steadily increases. This 
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satisfactory balance between 'give' and 'take' is the primary condition for further 
happiness.,,194 By essentially starting off in the whole; that is to say within a loss of love, 
love becomes the very thing that is sought out by the child throughout its life. Without 
such a loss to repair there appears to be no motivation behind out relationships; in fact 
they would appear rather meaningless in nature. 
I will now move on to a critique of Deleuze and Guattari' s notion of the other as 
defined through an interpretation of what Deleuze calls in Difference and Repetition 
"simulacra." Following this I will then consider Kristeva's interpretation of the "stranger 
qua Other and contrast this notion against Klein as well as Deleuze and Guattari, showing 
how the former trumps the latter two. 
The Other and Simulacra 
Lutz Ellrich, in an article entitled Negativity and Difference: On Gilles Deleuze 's 
Criticism of Dialectics, shows that Deleuze overwrites Hegel's dialectic of master and 
slave, endorsing the interpretation put forth by Nietzsche in his On the Genealogy of 
Morals. Ellrich writes, "Whereas the term "master" designates an active force that 
forgoes the negation of what it is not and relishes in its proper difference, the word 
"slave" designates a reactive force that hastens to involve itself in oppositional 
relationships with everything that it is not". 195 This hearkens back to Kojeve's reading of 
Hegel where it was illustrated that the master/slave relationship did not embody a mutual 
recognition. The master was recognized qua master by himself and the slave, but the 
master did not recognize the slave as an essential value in-itself. This is because the 
master is the self-affirmed value, and he is recognized as such. In not recognizing the 
slave, he does not recognize his negation. This allows the active master to self-reflexively 
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affirm himself. This self-reflexivity of the active master recognizing, or affirming, 
himself as the singular value (qua difference) is what is considered by Ellrich to be a 
"doubling of singularity". "Sameness with itself amounts to the duplicity of the same". 196 
In other words, difference-in-itself is a production capable of manifesting itself without 
recourse or reference to its negation (slave). The fact remains, however, that the slave is 
in fact present. The master does not see (recognize) the slave's presence because he 
projects onto the situation a "veil" so to speak that reflects back upon the master that 
which the master desires to perceive: a world that is for-self. This is the production of 
"simulacra" in Deleuze. The term "simulacra" is a technical and difficult term for 
Deleuze and therefore I will consider it some detail now. 
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze defines "simulacra" thus: 
By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very 
idea of a model of privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the 
instance which includes a difference within itself, such as ... two divergent series on which it 
plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and 
197 
a copy. 
Because the master did not concede defeat in the 'fight to the death' he is not negated. 
The master is allowed to partake in the pleasures of nature without being forced to 
recognize a divide between his pleasures and the nature from which they derive. This is 
because he does not have to labour upon nature. The border that separates the joyous 
affects which are part of the master's body from the joyous affects in nature becomes 
blurred. The joys of nature (impulses, drives, energies, powers, etc.) become his, and his 
joys become natures. As such the master sees in nature no distinction independent of his 
body; instead he sees the affects that compose his body dissolved and disseminated 
throughout nature. These dissolved and disseminated affects (or difference-in-itself) are 
what are called simulacra. 
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To reiterate in perhaps clearer terminology, that which is produced is the 
affirmation of the master as the One recognized in nature. The image of the master is 
doubled in-on-itself and cast out into the world. Nature is recognized as something valued 
in-itself only because the master sees himself (the only valued being) in nature. Thus 
nature becomes recognized by the master as "sameness-differentiated"; that is to say, 
"difference" as different manifestations of the same thing. This is what I take Deleuze 
and Guattari's equation PLURALISM=MONISM to be suggesting. 198 
Ellrich, however, picks up on the fact that in order for Deleuze's theory of 
difference and multiplicity to work, Deleuze requires a mode-of-thought characteristic of 
the active master. For only the master can recognize difference free of negation. This 
thought must be capable of grasping both standpoints of the participants involved: master 
and slave. Ellrich writes, "The master's (aesthetic) differential thought is only capable of 
apprehending difference,,199 and thus cannot understand the participant's position on the 
other side of the relationship (the slave's). Likewise because of its position in the 
relationship, the slave "is not in a position to see what is proper to difference"?OO There is 
an Other out there in the world that goes unacknowledged by self-consciousness that self-
consciousness (qua self-affirmative master, or difference-differentiated) is dependent 
upon. Self-affirmative consciousness chooses not to recognize its dependence upon an 
Other (the slave) since it can only perceive things qua simulacra. Thus the "differential 
thought of the master, consequently, cannot be the cardinal model of a theory" as Deleuze 
would have it.201 Difference does not account for the Other's experience as an 
autonomous subject, because the Other does not experience the world as pure difference 
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but instead as that which it is not. This is because the slave labours upon nature and this 
involves negating what is present to it and reconfiguring it anew. 
As Ellrich says, "Deleuze refuses to acknowledge this dialectic". 202 
The simulacra produced through the self-reflexivity of the master affirming itself are 
"projected onto the actual prevailing divergences and decentralizations,,203 between 
master and slave. Simulacra, by definition, simulate. In the present situation it is a case of 
simulating that which is actually present to the master though the master does not 
recognize it as such: the great divide between the master and slave. Ellrichwrites, "by 
virtue of this structural property, the simulacra is in a position to simulate the identical, 
the similar, and the negative and thus to fulfill its essential task,,?04 It is my contention, 
in light of this reference to Ellrich, that Deleuze's "simulacra" is negation rehashed. The 
corollary to Hegel's master/slave dialectic is that the master becomes conscious of the 
fact that he is only master because of the slave's slavishness. Therefore 'dialectically' the 
slave in fact becomes the master insofar as the aforementioned master was in fact truly 
slave. In order to prevent this dialectical subversion of difference existing as such (qua 
self-affirmed difference) Deleuze inserts 'simulacra' to prevent such an event from ever 
occurring. This preventative measure assures the active forces of the master and his self-
affirmative project; however, it permanently negates the actual resultant conditions as 
they emerged at the end of the fight-to-the-death. That is to say, simulacra negate the 
autonomy and importance of the slave, or the Other, which nonetheless has implications 
for subjectivity. 
The ironic part to Deleuze's reading of the dialectic is that his desire for real and 
authentic difference leads him to posit the very thing he set out to do away with: the 
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negative. 'Simulacra' functions for Deleuze in a way that negation functions for 
philosophers of negativity. Ellrich continues to add that Deleuze "filters out the actually 
negative, but simultaneously generates the simulated negative,,.205 In attempting to 
construct a philosophy of affirmation, Deleuze attempted to do away with the dialectic 
based on the understanding that it was reductive and did not allow for the proliferation of 
difference. This appears to be something that is inescapable. 
One can already see the implications that Deleuze and Guattari' s absent 
endorsement of negation and negativity have with respect to Otherness. I will address 
these concerns in greater detail in the next section; however, for now I want to examine 
two principle issues concerning what I consider Deleuze and Guattari' s move of sneaking 
negation through the back-door. The first point of interest has to do with an ironic 
contradiction in their adopted Nietzschean position. Through affirming a "multiplicity" 
they are in fact endorsing a decadent life which is something Nietzsche rejected. The 
second point has to do with language. 
Affirmation and decadence --
I am skeptical to the consistency that Deleuze and Guattari are displaying within 
their own thought. They claim that a person is capable and indeed ought to explore the 
various selves within their Self. Consider Deleuze's reading of Roberte's rape by the 
Colossus and Hunchback in Klossowski's Roberte se soir as well as Octave's voyeurism. 
Deleuze contends that through the act of witnessing the rape Octave multiplies his 
enjoyment of Roberte through taking in the expressions of her transgressors. Likewise 
Roberte is thought to be opened up and enlightened to her various selves in her 
encounters with the rapists. 
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... when Octave establishes the law ofhospitability according to which he "gives" his wife Roberte 
to his guests. He attempts to multiply Roberte's essence, to create as many simulacra and 
reflections of Roberte as there are persons establishing relations with her, and to inspire Roberte to 
emulate somehow her own doubles, thanks to which Octave, the voyeur, possesses and is able to 
know her better than ifhe had kept her, quite simply, for himself 06 
Aside from the moral questionability of using this literary excerpt as model for an ethics 
of self-transformation, I find that this transgresses Deleuze and Guattari's foundational 
belief in the primacy of affirmation. The act of wanting to produce multiples of both 
himself (Octave) and his wife Roberte, parallels the Christian believer who wants there so 
desperately to be another world, a world other than this one. This is not affirmation of 
multiplicities and simulacra; this is negation and denial of the Self that is. 
I want to respond to the rebuttal which might argue that although Octave seeks to 
multiply both himself and Roberte an infinite number oftimes, the Christian believer 
seeks a multiple that ultimately has an end: Heaven; the latter is not characteristic of the 
eternal return that Klossowski championed in Nietzsche's writings. The quantity of the 
multiples sought need not matter, for it is the structure of the multiple that is important. 
Nietzsche thought that any institution which purported to strive for another world other 
than this one was decadent and descending. Deleuze and Guattari are guilty of just this. 
Deleuze does state explicitly in Difference and Repetition that "in every psychic system 
there is a swarm of possibilities around reality, but our possibilities are always Other [ ... ] 
This face expresses a possible world".207 To be fair, in Nietzsche and Philosophy 
Deleuze does guard against the charge that this situation might be considered negative. 
Therefore he writes about "active negations", where "Active negation ... is the state of 
strong spirits which destroy the reactive in themselves, submitting it to the test of the 
eternal return and submitting themselves to this test even if it entails willing their own 
decline".208 Nonetheless the structure of incorporating negation in some form persists and 
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thus to quote Horkheimer and Adorno again, it seems as though Deleuze and Guattari are 
endorsing a "consoling affirmation,,209 to cover up a negation that they cannot avoid. 
Language --
Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of negation and their subsequent deployment of 
simulacra is highly complicated by language. Deleuze and Guattari write that "it is true 
that the other disposes of a means to endow the possibilities that it expresses with reality, 
independently of the development we cause them to undergo. This means is language".210 
Language is utilized as a tool that the subject can use to make manifest for an Other the 
possible world they open up for an other whom they encounter. However, languages 
capacity to open up a wholly Other world for an other, in Deleuze and Guattari, is thrown 
into doubt. This is because of Deleuze and Guattari' s understanding of language as the 
product of an "assemblage" and not the individual's "inner life". Gadamer shares my 
concern when he speaks of a lover's discourse. "When we hear modem lovers talking to 
each other, we often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising 
labels and technical terms from the sign language ofthe modem industrial world,,?l1 
How can the Other, in Deleuze and Guattari, open up a wholly Other world of 
possibilities to me if the Other is nothing more than a mere conduit through which the 
discourse of the "assemblage" speaks through everyone already? 
This problem does not exist for Kristeva. When we consider a truly passionate 
and amorous relationship, language fails to convey what it is that I desire to say to my 
beloved. Thus language fails me in allowing for a "reality" to be conveyed - ready made 
-- to the other. The speech of the lover is that of a subject who is uncertain about what to 
say. The lover is "tongue tied", stammers, makes noises, gasps, and so on. This attempt to 
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convey a reality is indicative of something that for Kristeva has been negated: the baby-
talk or echolalias reminiscent of our "inexhaustible source of excitement;,,212 that is to 
say, the pre-subjective state of being. Kristeva writes, "Putting love into words ... 
necessarily summons up not the narcissistic parry but what appears to me as narcissistic 
economy [ ... ] It is a view that we cannot necessarily share with our partners but to which 
our dreams, our anguish, and our jouissance bear witness".213 Gadamer corroborates this 
point made by Kristeva when he suggests that "stammering is the obstruction of a desire 
to speak and is thus opened into the infinite realm of possible expression".214 As elated 
lovers we find ourselves in a state, a relationship, where the only authentic way we "feel" 
that we can express ourselves is by conjuring up the language of that love relationship 
that was our first; that of our primary narcissism. However this "impossible object, 
unnamable secret, absolute taboo,,21S is lost and therefore we stammer, since we cannot 
say anything about it. 
Deleuze and Guattari do not acknowledge this "unnamable secret" and as such 
assume that the utility they assign to language in general (for purposes of conferring 
"reality on the possible as suCh,,216) holds true for the speech of the lovers. Experience 
appears to support Kristeva's insight. Even she confesses to this truth at the beginning of 
her Tales of Love, "No matter how far back my love memories go, I find it difficult to 
talk about them ... ". 217 
Kristeva salvages the notion of "drive" in the idea of the chora such that this 
"imaginary construct" can account for why our body and language appear unable to 
communicate that which we want to communicate to an Other. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze 
and Guattari tell how "desiring-machines" break-down. What they fail to account for is 
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why they break down. Kristeva's notion ofthe child's relation to the primal mother 
accounts for this absent mechanism. In The Feminine and the Sacred Kristeva references 
along with the Greeks, Hannah Arendt's distinction between zoos (biological life ) and 
bios (the life to be told, capable of being written). She continues to say that, ''the human 
body, and, even more dramatically, the body of a woman, is a strange intersection 
between zoos and bios, physiology and narration, genetics and biography,,?18 Recall 
Kristeva's articulation of how the mother brings about language in the infant 
("Motherhood Today"). Language arises during a relationship which is non-representable 
as such to one's consciousness and thus it is impossible to speak of Deleuze and 
Guattari's employment of simulacra is insufficient to account for how language opens up 
a wholly Other world for an other and is on par with what Allison Weir calls a "negative 
hallucination" of an unachieved identification.219 The other does not open up a wholly 
Other world for me so much as it represents that which is wholly unknowable 'in' myself. 
The Other is capable of achieving this even if they experience the inability to say 
anything at all. 
Kristeva and the strange Other 
By now it ought to clear that Deleuze and Guattari indeed do believe that the 
subject exists; albeit in a radically reconfigured way. The above discussion, which has 
touched on the topic of the Other qua simulacra has illustrated that the place of the Other 
remains external to the subjects singularity. This is of course not all that different from 
how many modern thinkers have conceived the place of the Other; that is to say: out 
there. What Deleuze and Guattari's contributions have been to this tradition is to 
revaluate what the Other has to offer the subject and how that is worked out. In any case, 
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because the Deleuze and Guattari's Other remains external relative to the subject, the 
present author argues that the power of the Other is greatly weakened. 
On the other hand, opposed to the Other being external to the subject, Kristeva 
situates the Other within the subject, and indeed makes this internalization of Otherness 
constitutive to her notion of subjectivity. In Strangers to Ourselves she recasts the Other 
in the notion ofthe "foreigner." She writes: 
[A] foreigner is neither the romantic victim of our clannish indolence nor the intruder responsible 
for al the ills of the polis ... Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our 
identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affirming founder. 
By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself?20 
Kristeva is picking up from where Klein left off, while simultaneously making significant 
advances on Klein. For example although the internalization of the Other (i.e. the 
foreigner) smacks of Klein's account of the internalization of the "good" and "bad" 
mother/breast, Kristeva points out in Revolution in Poetic Language that "psychoanalysis 
acknowledges that the pre-Oedipal stages Melanie Klein discusses are 'analytically 
unthinkable' ,,,221 while, however, not being wholly inoperative. What this means is that 
although Klein pointed to the phenomenal effects of the internalization of the mother, she 
failed to provide an sufficient mechanism for how this internalization worked it effects. 
What one finds in Kristeva's interpretation of the internalization of the Other that 
one does not find in Klein is an idea of "motivation." I mean motivation here in the sense 
that there is an underlying force at play (e.g. the semiotic chora) that pushes the subject 
forever onward, never letting s/he remain static. This is an advantage Kristeva has over 
Deleuze and Guattari, for the latter propose on Anti-Oedipus the fact that "It is at work 
everywhere [Desiring-Production],,222 but they do not provide a mechanism - regardless 
how abstract - for what sets that Desiring in motion. Kristeva's split subject is constantly 
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engaged in being forced to negotiate the confrontation of its own wholly unknown 
semiotic drives with the thetic, the latter being what the subject posits during the 
signifying process in order to recognize itself qua subject. "In other words, the subject 
must be firmly posited by castration so that drive attacks against the thetic will not give 
way to fantasy or to psychosis but will instead lead to a 'second-degree thetic,' i.e., a 
resumption of the functioning characteristic of the semiotic chora within the signifying 
device oflanguage.,,223 Thus the subjects understanding of, or ability to recognize 
themselves as a discernible subject is constantly frustrated; frustrated to the point where 
the subject appears foreign (Other) to itself. 
The incorporation of the semiotic chora as constitutive of the subject in Kristeva, 
which is brought about by the child's need to find satisfaction in language to compensate 
for the loss of the mother, "configures" the subject such that they are forever "motivated" 
onward while never being certain of who or what they are. The Kristevan subject is 
literally a foreigner in a strange land. She writes in Strangers to Ourselves: "Without a 
home,,224 the subject "seeks that invisible and promised territory, that country that does 
not exist but that he bears in his dreams, and that must indeed be called a beyond ... The 
foreigner, thus, has lost his mother.,,225 The decision to include the latter reference to the 
loss of the mother is strategic insofar as it is meant to conjure up the influence Klein 
impacted upon Kristeva. A major difference between the two thinkers, however, is that 
whereas Klein thinks that these neurosis brought about by the feelings of guilt can be 
somewhat exercised with respect to the internalization of the Other, Kristeva does not see 
this as the case. 
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For Klein this internalization is pathology; for Kristeva it is what constitutes our 
subjectivity. We can indeed work with this disposition, but we can never do away with it. 
With the Freudian notion of the unconscious the involution of the strange in the psyche loses its 
pathological aspect and integrates within the assumed unity of human beings an otherness that is 
both biological and symbolic and becomes an integral part of the same. Henceforth the foreigner is 
neither a race nor a nation ... Uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners. 226 
Kristeva's arguments do not conflate with the Freud Civilization and its Discontents who 
asserted that human-kind will essentially remain dissatisfied and miserable -- sublimated, 
as their drives are, to the development of culture. Kristeva utilizes the psychoanalytic 
notion of transference and projects it against the backdrop of the negativity which allows 
for her subject to be. "It is through unraveling transference - the major dynamics of 
otherness, oflovelhatred for the other, of the foreign component of our psyche - that, on 
the basis of the other, I become reconciled with my own otherness-foreignness, that I play 
on it and live by it.,,227 Kristeva assumes certain psychoanalytic premises that position her 
in some ways as a pessimist with respect to the "human condition," she does make the 
appropriate amendments to Freud's theory such that her optimistic Marxism can shine 
through brighter; wherein the process of working toward a better "condition" can at least 
be conceived - if only it remains 'imaginary.' 
Finally here I want to state what I perceive to be one of the most significant 
advantages that Kristeva's conception of subjectivity has over that of Deleuze and 
Guattari's. The latter do indeed advance a well argued case for the status of a radically 
de-structured - anti-Oedipal- subject. This de-subjectivized subject is one that they 
claim will resist the static, stifling, taming effects of being a subject proper. What I mean 
by "subject proper" is nothing more than shoring up of a subject based on some 
underlying constitutive factor. Take for example Kristeva's reading of the Heideggerian 
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subject being constituted upon cura [care] or the Lacanian subject as one defined in terms 
of desire (indeed a subj ect of desire). With respect to the Heideggerian subj ect, "care this 
becomes the 'basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs 
to a world-view [Weltanschaulich] must move' .,,228 Deleuze and Guattari's subject is no 
different and thus no less tamed than the Heideggerian or Lacanian subject. 
Deleuze and Guattari's subject is one that is firmly "rooted" in such concepts as 
"assemblages," "multiplicities," and "packs." The subject may indeed be one that is 
mobile and fluid but it can only be interpreted as such through explicit (symbolic) 
concepts such as those listed above. Quite simply, too much can be said about the subject 
in Deleuze and Guattari. Kristeva is not susceptible to the same criticism as this because 
of the fact that she endorses and modifies Hegel's notion of negativity. Insofar as the 
process of negativity cannot be named or spoken of in any sense whatsoever, there is a 
fundamental characteristic of the subject in the latter's thought which resists 
conceptualization of any kind. Kristeva writes that "the foreigner has no self. Barely an 
empty confidence, valueless, which focuses his possibilities of being constantly other ... I 
do what they want me to, but it is not "me" - "me" is elsewhere, "me" belongs to no one, 
"me" does not belong to "me," '" does "me" exist?,,229 This questioning of the 
ontological status of the "me" is tantamount to calling into question the underlying 
structure of the "I." Kristeva does not allow for there to be any foundation (even the 
condition of an "assemblage" or "multiplicity") from which to conceive a subject. This is 
what makes Kristeva subject-in-process so radical and progressive in nature: her adoption 
of negativity via the material embodiment of the unconscious. 
Deleuze's Other-structure, or a reluctant chora? 
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The present thesis has advanced Kristeva's interpretation of the subject as 
advantageous over that of Deleuze and Guattari' s. Throughout this thesis I have also 
proclaimed cautious skepticism with respect to the latter in general. However I want this 
final section to be somewhat conciliatory in nature; however, if full conciliation is indeed 
impossible or shown to be recalcitrant, let it at least serve as an attempt to bridge an 
otherwise unbridgeable gap between to philosophers. This final section attempts to show 
that there is an aspect to Deleuze and Guattari that is extremely sympathetic to the 
indebtedness one has with respect to the Other in the constitution of ones SUbjectivity; so 
much so that one can see Deleuze - especially in his early solo work - flirting with the 
notion of an internalized Other as the precondition for the possibilities of being. 
Until now it has been understood that Deleuze and Guattari are hostile to the role 
the Other plays with respect to the constitution of subjectivity insofar as the Other is 
implicated in any serious way when it comes to - let us say - the ordering ones drives. 
Earlier I examined the function of the Other as it is embodied in the form of the lifeguard, 
for example, and the excerpt of 'learning to swim' from Difference and Repetition. To go 
beyond this and to set up my commentary to follow, consider the status of the 
"apprentice" as it is conceived in Deleuze's early work: 
The apprentice ... raises each faculty to the level of its transcendent exercise. With regard to 
sensibility, he attempts to give birth to that second power which grasps that which can only be 
sensed. This is the education of the senses. From one faculty to another is communicated a 
violence which nevertheless always understands the Other through the perfection of each [ ... ] We 
never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good 
at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think.230 
Deleuze's point is well received that it is indeed impossible to say exactly how someone 
will learn a particular concept or become a philosopher, etc., and in this sense he is 
justified in calling into question many of the pre-established institutional practices that 
are assumed to "organize" the human condition "for the better." That being said, he is 
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equally misguided in thinking that he can sidestep these "negativities," having developed 
an interpretation of subjectivity founded on the concept of affirmation. For any system, 
schizoanalysis included (as well as psychoanalysis), is going to impose upon its object a 
certain structure necessary for any observation to occur in the first place. 
Consider Werner Heisenberg's "uncertainty principle." By virtue of the mere 
presence of a perceiving subject within a given system, that same system has already 
been structured in a way whereby the perceiver has projected onto the system values and 
meaning that are relevant to a particular human world. Perhaps what remains "behind" or 
"beneath" these projected values and meanings is something akin to the substantia 
occulta that Locke theorized about. However I tend to think that this occult substance is 
best interpreted as being purely ineffable - whereby to even name it substantia occulta is 
going too far. Listen to Heisenberg's thoughts on the uncertainty of words: 
[The] intrinsic uncertainty of the meaning of words was ... recognized very early and has brought 
about the need for definitions, or - as the word 'defmition' says - for the setting of boundaries that 
determine where the word is to be used and where not. But definitions can be given only with the 
help of other concepts, and so one will finally have to rely on some concepts that are taken as they 
are, unanalyzed and undefined 231 
Heisenberg concludes that in our use of language we must inevitably rely on words that 
remain undefined. They are indeed there - present in the sentence and conveyed in the 
meaning - but they themselves go completely undefined or noticed as such. They make 
possible the other words in the sentence. This analogy is meant to implicate the role of 
the semiotic chora, or the wholly Otherness constitutive of our subjectivity, that goes 
completely undefined or spoken of On the contrary, I suggest that Kristeva successfully 
sidesteps this issue with her re-introduction of the chora and the fact that one can never 
say anything about it: "although the chora can be designated and regulated, it can never 
be definitively posited: as a result, one can situate the chora and, if necessary, lend it a 
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topology, but one can never give it axiomatic form.,,232 Kristeva takes that which Deleuze 
rejects - violent training - and recasts it in terms of a necessary trauma; that is, the loss of 
the pre-objectal mother. 
However, a close reading ofDeleuze reveals language that one ought to be 
suspicious, especially with respect to what has just been determined concerning Deleuze 
and Guattari' s notion of the Other as an apprentice that enforces a violent training. Recall 
the concept of simulacra and how the Other is cast in terms of this simulacra in Deleuze 
and Guattari. Further recall that the implications of this interpretation were such that the 
Other (and the I) were no longer conceived in terms of subjects per se, or organisms, but 
as Body's without Organs freely exchanging energies, intensities, and so on. Deleuze 
then says: "that the Other should now, properly speaking, be anyone, neither you nor I, 
signifies that it is a structure which is implemented only by variable terms in different 
perceptual worlds - me for you in yours, you for me in mine.,,233 This is important, for it 
shows an overall weakness in Deleuze's argument for rejecting the internalization of the 
Other within the subject. 
If the Other is "neither you nor I" but instead "a structure" which is implemented 
and which traverses and penetrates through each and every "anybody," then the Other-
insofar as it exists - must be posited transcendentally and thereby constituting a "space" 
within which the multiplicity of intensities and energies can be exchanged between 
various Bodies without Organs. This prospect is corroborated by the following in 
Difference and Repetition: "It is not even enough to see in the Other a specific or 
particular structure of the perceptual world in general: in fact, it is a structure which 
grounds and ensures the overall functioning of this world as a whole. ,,234 The essence of 
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"grounding" and "ensuring" are terms used which possess "nurturing," one might dare 
say, "maternal" overtones. Like Kristeva, Deleuze remains resolutely ambiguous with 
respect to what is actually said of the Other. What is known, however, is that it has a 
constitutive function insofar as it "grounds" the overall functioning of the world as a 
whole - the world of course being that which the subject is fully integrated within and 
implicated throughout. 
Finally, and this I consider to be the most damaging with respect to Deleuze and 
Guattari's case that the Other is not internalized and thereby minimally - if at all --
constitutive of subjectivity. Deleuze writes that "Notions necessary for the descriptions of 
this world ... would remain empty and inapplicable if the Other were not there to give 
expression to those possible worlds in which that which is (for us) in the background is 
pre-perceived or sub-perceived as a possible form.,,235 This excerpt almost reeks of 
Berkeley's Idealism, insofar as the world and the objects therein are maintain because 
they are perceived by the mind of God when no Earthly subject is around to perceive 
them. Deleuze claims that the Other, which cannot be denoted anywhere (and thus neither 
subject not object) serves a similar role as dos Berkeley's God. The Other perceives a 
possible world (i.e. pre-perceived or sub-perceived) such that by means of the exchange 
of energies and intensities I might then be opened up to and exposed to these worlds. In 
any case, in order for the subject to exists qua multiplicity and/or pack in Deleuze and 
Guattari, an Other (according to the latter) must be implicated in order for the notion of 
this subject to be "full" of meaning and be "applicable" to the world at large. Since the 
Other is neither I nor you but somewhere and nowhere in-between it must at some point 
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converge, penetrate, or intersect with the subject qua multiplicity/pack. Operationally this 
interpretation holds the same weight as the internalization of the Other in Kristeva. 
The notion of "internalization" is further hinted at when Deleuze annexes the 
concept of "rupture" into the dialogue. 
The delineation of objects, the transitions as well as the ruptures, the passage from one object to 
another, and even the fact that one world disappears in favour of another, the fact that there is 
always something else implicated which remains to be explicated or developed - all this is made 
possible only by the Other-structure and its expressive power in perception. In short, it is the 
Other-structure that ensures individuation within the perceptual world?36 
In order for change in the prevailing structures ofthe subject to occur, whether it is the 
structure of a multiplicity or pack, there must be a rupture of some description. However 
in order for this rupture to occur and thus be considered a rupture proper, there must be a 
boundary posited. Thus even though it is a drastically re-worked model for subjectivity 
with fuzzy logic and indeterminate borders the Deleuze and Guattarian subject retains the 
essence of a thetic boundary and thus one that can be penetrated by the "internal" 
motions and force of an Other-structure. 
Conclusions (-en-proces) 
Zizek wrote that, "those who want 'free sexuality delivered of the Oedipal burden 
of guilt and anxiety' proceed in the same way as the worker who wants to survive as a 
worker without a capitalist; they also fail to take into account the ways their position is 
'mediated' by the Other,,?37 This allows Zizek to state his conclusion that, "in short, anti-
Oedipus is the ultimate Oedipal myth ... ".238 This excerpt functions like the Lacanian 
"Thing" around which I will "circumambulate" my concluding remarks with respect to 
the above critique. The most general of my conclusions is that although full of promise 
and practicality, for I truly consider it a "practical philosophy," Deleuze and Guattari's 
philosophy of subjectivity as founded upon pure affirmation is held in check by certain 
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limitations; specifically pertaining to the Other and the subject's position relative to this 
Other. More specific conclusions on this matter are summarized below: 
(1) Deleuze and Guattari under-value the notion ofloss that Kristeva is privy 
toward. This loss - that of the pre-objectal mother -- is constitutive of human subjectivity. 
It is the "event" that accounts for the subject's being as one that is perpetually in process 
(i.e. Kristeva's subject-in-process). The death of Addie (the mother) in Faulkner's As I 
Lay Dying sets in motion an entire chain of events that transcend the family borders. 
Reflecting on their mother's death, Dewey Dell laments, "I heard that my mother is dead. 
I wish I had time to let her die. I wish I had time to wish I had,,?39 Dewey Dell's loss of 
Addie (the mother) is a perfect when explaining how the subject becomes such. Before 
the structures ofthe symbolic and our culture imprints upon us a certain subjectivity the 
pre-subjective ordering of the maternal chora organizes SUbjectivity on a primordial level. 
However this primordial organization is marred by a haunting notion of loss. For that is 
what it takes to move us from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. We can never fully 
recover from this trauma -- this loss. There are certain losses, separations, breaks, and 
ruptures, constitutive of life that simply cannot be affirmed. This is what makes Deleuze 
and Guattari's philosophical project questionable at best. 
(2) Deleuze and Guattari's desire to articulate a philosophical system founded 
upon pure affirmation required them to refute the existence of negation and negativity. 
This was shown to be problematic insofar as a philosophy devoted to pure multiplicity 
might be looked upon as "decadent" in the Nietzschean sense of the term. The rejection 
of the negative and negativity also triggered doubt with respect to the authentic nature of 
one's language insofar as language opens up a possible world (of the Other) for the 
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subject. If there is no negation and consequently no inner space to the subject (Other), 
what world is it exactly that is being made available for an Other? Indeed there cannot be 
a world of the Other in the strictest sense. 
(3) Otherness. Deleuze and Guattari do away with the other insofar as they do not 
acknowledge the other as a wholly Other. The Other is important to develop as a concept 
because it implicates upon our moral being. Deleuze and Guattari' s understanding of the 
Other (qua simulacra) does not allow deep relationships to develop. The Other is another 
partial-object by means of which I might strengthen my BwO. This relation to the Other 
is superficial and transient; it is the only way for the Deleuze and Guattarian subject to 
enact the ethical life the authors espouse. 
(4) The notion of negation that Kristeva salvages with respect to subjectivity in 
the form ofloss of the primordial love-object (pre-objectal mother) provides a 
motivation, movement, or drive; an unrepresentable guide or purpose for our actions in 
the world. With Deleuze and Guattari, however, there is nothing motivating the subject to 
take up one endeavor over the other. As such there is a fundamental meaninglessness 
underpinning any action Deleuze and Guattari assume in order to "become" something 
else. The negation that constitutes Kristeva's subject is preferred insofar as one's actions 
are not inherently meaningless but motivated by the currents of the semiotic forever 
driving the subject onwards into relationships in hope of recovering (but forever failing to 
attain) the love of loss. 
The "motivation" that this loss instills within our life is characterized by that 
which is unknown - our own unknowablness. Beardsworth calls this "unacknowledged 
suffering". Unacknowledged suffering, no matter how depressing such a concept may 
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seem, is unavoidable -- indeed necessary. It is what allows the subject to engage in a 
caring relationship with itself. Even Francis Bacon, an artist on whom Deleuze wrote a 
book stated that his experience of painting followed a similar logic: "I like being alone -
left with my own despair of being able to do anything at all on the canvas,,?40 For 
Kristeva, art is an ideal occasion to cultivate and experiment with the pangs of 
unacknowledged suffering. In a sense, the notion of unacknowledged suffering salvages 
the notion of a private or "sacred" space that one does not easily locate in Deleuze and 
Guattari. This might be a topic of interest on which one might chose to pursue further 
research, insofar as the sacred allows for a sight that is inaccessible to the socius, a socius 
which in Deleuze and Guattari the subject is instantaneously connected to at all times 
through the practice of achieving a BwO. 
I would like to conclude this thesis with some reflections on why we ought to 
prefer Kristeva's psychoanalytic paradigm to Deleuze and Guattari. The conclusions 
drawn above have illustrated some vital limitations with an understanding of subjectivity 
founded upon pure affirmation. By assuming the psychoanalytic line of thought, Kristeva 
salvages many important concepts that are helpful when analyzing human behaviour. Her 
salvaging of the Freudian death drive and negation allow for a much more effective 
platform on which to found a basis for long lasting resistance to de-humanization and/or 
de-subj ectivization. 
Kristeva's account of the subject does possess the elements necessary to resist co-
option by the prevailing powers. Considering that subjectivity is constituted upon a 
primordial moment of loss, the subject is never satisfied with the status of their being. 
Insofar as the subject is never satisfied it can never possibly be coaxed or seduced into 
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becoming (even temporarily) a certain kind of subject. The subject is depressed and in 
need of constant change. The desire for constant change is a result of the Kristevan 
subject being poised on the brink of total collapse. To prevent that from actually 
occurring, the subject is constantly in the process of erecting symbolic discourses in 
hopes that they will meet the subject's desire for narcissistic satisfaction. Not even the 
fragments of the "old" power structures hold potential for the depressive. The depressive, 
in a state of permanent mourning for the lost Thing, completely starts over; this time with 
an entirely new set from which to conjure up or create meaning. Kristeva writes, 
the work of art that insures the rebirth of its author and its reader or viewer is one that succeeds in 
integrating the artificial language it puts forward (new style, new composition, surprising 
imagination) and the unnamed agitations of an omnipotent self that ordinary social and linguistic 
usage always leave somewhat orphaned or plunged into mourning.241 
However it must be emphasized that the ability to start over is only made possible by a 
psychic structure that allows for that function. This ability to return, or restart is what I 
consider genuine revolt. It is also the only way that the power and dignity of the 
individual might be salvaged in a postmodem era where hope seems futile. 
Finally, consider Kristeva's research on the etymology of the "revolt".242 
Kristeva's understanding of revolt is implicitly tethered to the act of "returning to ... ". 
This is in line with Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition that is predicated upon 
returning to the origins of psychic organization. Consider Kristeva's account of the 
revolutionary potential in poetic language and how it is made possible through an 
understanding of the repressed workings of the chora. Kristeva writes that, "the poet is 
put to death because he wants to turn rhythm into a dominant element because he wants 
to make language perceive what it doesn't want to say, provide it with its matter 
independently of the sign, and free it from denotation".243 The poet consciously or 
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unconsciously distorts the symbolic and thus distorts the conventionally accepted mode 
of what constitutes subjectivity. However this process of growth and change is made 
possible only because of the repressed workings of the semiotic chora, the loss of the 
Mother, inscribed upon the psyche of the child. Deleuze and Guattari were so concerned 
with dismantling and putting to rest the Oedipal "father" characteristic of Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory that they did not adequately take into consideration the 
implications of a "mother" ... the semiotic chora. 
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